Local Independent Directors with Financial Expertise and Executive Compensation and Turnover
- 2015年第8卷 
【中文摘要】本文以2008～2012年的上市公司为研究样本，探讨聘用财务背景的当地独立董事（local independent directors，LIDs)能否对高管现金薪酬和变更产生影响。实证研究发现，聘用财务背景的当地独立董事的公司，其高管的现金薪酬较高，但高管的现金薪酬和业绩敏感度较低，高管变更和业绩敏感度较低。研究还发现，财务背景的当地独立董事对高管现金薪酬的影响，不受产权性质的影响。本文对财务背景独立董事的治理作用提供了经验证据。 【Abstract】 Using China's public firms during 2008-2012, this study examines whether the local independent directors (LIDs) with financial expertise can strengthen or weaken themonitoring power of the board over the management through designing the compensation contracts and making retention decisions. We document that executives receive higher cash compensation in firms hiring local LIDs with financial expertise , but such pay increase has lower pay-for-performance sensitivity. In addition, we find that executives are less likely to be fired in firms with local LIDs with financial expertise and their turnover-for-performance sensitivity weakens. The adverse effect of local LIDs with financial expertise on CEO compensation and turnover is less pronounced in state ownership enterprises (SOEs) or in firms with large shareholders.