中国资本市场A股公司自愿性半年报审计的动因研究：基于代理理论和公司治理的视角

Abstract

本文借助于中国资本市场上市公司半年报审计为研究者提供的良好的研究机遇，针对半年报 自愿审计、强制审计和未审计并存的现象，区分再融资公司、ST公司和其他公司，研究了上市公司半年报自愿审计的公司治理动因，为Jensen and Meckling(1976)和Watts and Zimmerman(1978)提出的“审计是能够增加公司价值的一种监督行为”、“审计行为是自发而非强制而出现的”等命题提供了经验证据，从而间接检验了审计需求的“代理假说”和“信号假说”、丰富了代理理论和公司治理的内涵。本文的研究发现，再融资公司、ST公司和其他公司进行半年报自愿审计的动机不同，或出于降低代理成本的考量、或出于信号传递的需要，结论并不一致。本文的研究贡献在于：① 明确区分了半年报的自愿审计和强制审计，在此基础上厘定了自愿审计的公司治理动因；② 根据目的和动机的差异，划分再融资公司、ST公司和其他公司，对半年报自愿审计行为进行了研究。

Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Watts and Zimmerman (1978) propose that “auditing is a supervisory behavior increasing corporate value” and “auditing is not a mandatory but voluntary behavior”. In China, the coexistence of voluntary auditing, mandatory auditing, and non-auditing of semi-annual report provides a unique research opportunity to test these propositions. This paper investigates the corporate governance motivation for voluntary auditing in this unique setting of semi-annual auditing. We classify listed companies into three categories: refinancing companies, special treatment companies, and other listed companies. We find that these three types of companies have different motivations for voluntary auditing of semi-annual report. Some have the motivation to reduce agency cost, while some have the motivation to signal to the market. By testing the agency theory and the signaling theory of auditing demand, our study enriches the literature of agency theory and corporate governance. Specifically, this paper has the following two contributions:① it clearly tests the corporate governance motivations for voluntary auditing by distinguishing voluntary and mandatory auditing of semi-annual report; and, ② it identifies different motivations for voluntary auditing among refinancing companies, special treatment companies, and other listed companies.