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dc.contributor.author杜兴强zh_CN
dc.contributor.author漆传金zh_CN
dc.date.accessioned2013-11-15T02:09:51Z
dc.date.available2013-11-15T02:09:51Z
dc.date.issued2013-11-15
dc.identifier.citation当代会计评论,2008,1(2):50-74.zh_CN
dc.identifier.urihttps://dspace.xmu.edu.cn/handle/2288/57044
dc.description.abstract本文以2001 ~ 2005 年深沪两市上市公司为研究样本, 以委托代理理论、团队生产理论等为基础, 通过构建混合横截面数据分析管理层持股与公司业绩之间的非线性关系, 验证“利益趋同假说” 和“防御假说” , 并对线性模型和非线性模型的解释力进行比较。在此基础上, 本文讨论管理层持股与公司业绩之间的内生性, 探讨在我国目前特殊的制度背景下到底管理层持股决定公司业绩, 还是公司业绩决定管理层持股, 抑或是管理层持股和公司业绩两者相互决定, 并对管理层持股和企业业绩之间的内生性采取三阶段回归模型(3SLS) 进行处理, 再次审视剔除内生性之后两者之间的相关性。最后, 本文 还分析不同行业的竞争程度对管理层持股与公司业绩之间关系的影响。本文的研究发现: ① 管理层持股与公司业绩之间呈二次非线性关系, 但线性模型和非线性模型在目前我国管理层持股总体水平偏低的情况下, 具有相似的解释和预测能力。② 通过建立单一方程和联立方程来分析两者的相互影响性, 发现管理层持股与公司业绩之间具有内生性。③ 行业竞争程度与管理层持股激励效果相关, 公司所处的行业竞争程度越高, 管理层持股的激励效果更好; 而越是垄断性的行业, 管理层持股的激励效果越差。zh_CN
dc.description.abstractThe paper investigates the companies listed in Shenghai and Shenzhen securities exchanges over the 2001 ~ 2005 period Using mixed cross sectional data , we analyze the nonlinear relation between managerial ownership and corporate performance and examine the the convergence of interest hypothesis and the entrenchment hypothesis We also compare the explanatory power between linear and nonlinear models Furthermore , the paper discusses the causes and consequences between managerial ownership and corporate performance to decide whether managerial ownership dominate corporate performance or corporate performance dominate managerial ownership or managerial ownership and corporate performance interactive underlying Chinese capital markets , and the paper adopts 3 SLS to deal with endogenous relation between managerial ownership and corporate performance Our results show that : firstly , there is a twosquare nonlinear relation between managerial ownership and corporate performance , but the explanatory power between linear and nonlinear model is similar  Secondly , the paper adopts single and Simultaneous Equation to analysis cause and consequences and finds that managerial ownership and corporate performance have endogenous relation . Final ly , industry competition characteristic affects the incentive effects of managerial ownership , and more competitive industry have better incentive effects , monopoly industry have worse or little incentive effectszh_CN
dc.language.isozhzh_CN
dc.publisher厦门大学《当代会计评论》编辑部zh_CN
dc.source.urihttp://210.34.5.19/newcar/car_show.asp?ID=36zh_CN
dc.subject管理层持股zh_CN
dc.subject公司业绩zh_CN
dc.subject模型解释力zh_CN
dc.subject内生性zh_CN
dc.subject行业竞争度zh_CN
dc.subjectmanagerial ownershipzh_CN
dc.subjectcorporate performancezh_CN
dc.subjectinterpretative ability of modelzh_CN
dc.subjectendogenouszh_CN
dc.subjectthe industry competition characteristiczh_CN
dc.title管理层持股与公司业绩的相关性:模型解释力、内生性与行业竞争度zh_CN
dc.title.alternativeManagerial Ownership and Corporate Performance : The Model Explanatory Power Endogeneity and the Industry Competition ,zh_CN
dc.typeArticlezh_CN
dc.description.note作者单位:厦门大学会计系\ 厦门大学会计发展研究中心,光大证券股份有限公司zh_CN


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