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dc.contributor.advisor任春艳
dc.contributor.author李扬
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-14T02:55:25Z
dc.date.available2016-02-14T02:55:25Z
dc.date.issued2011-06-20 15:56:11.0
dc.identifier.urihttps://dspace.xmu.edu.cn/handle/2288/28313
dc.description.abstract两权分离是现代企业的一大特征,在有效提高企业经营管理效率的同时,也带来了新的代理问题。委托代理双方的目标不完全一致性和信息不对称性可能使代理效率大打折扣。股权激励把管理者的薪酬福利与企业的价值紧密联系起来,能促使管理人员和股东的利益趋同。但由于信息的不对称性,作为理性经济人的管理者容易采取激进的会计政策,实施盈余管理,背离股权激励的初衷。财务重述作为考察盈余管理的重要线索,在研究授予股权激励的管理人员是否进行信息操纵中具有重大的揭示作用。 我国2006年起实行的《证券法》、《公司法》、《上市公司股权激励管理办法》等法律法规,为股权激励的应用提供了法律依据和保障。国内股权激励的应用呈逐年上升趋...
dc.description.abstractThe separation of ownership and management, as a major characteristic of contemporary firms, could improve operational management efficiency enormously, but also brings forth the agency problem. The objective inconsistency as well as information asymmetry of the principal-agent may reduce the agency efficiency sharply .The equity-based incentive link managerial salary and welfare with firm value c...
dc.language.isozh_CN
dc.relation.urihttps://catalog.xmu.edu.cn/opac/openlink.php?strText=27506&doctype=ALL&strSearchType=callno
dc.source.urihttps://etd.xmu.edu.cn/detail.asp?serial=30400
dc.subject股权激励
dc.subject财务重述
dc.subject误报
dc.subjectequity-based incentive
dc.subjectfinancial restatement
dc.subjectmisreport
dc.title中国上市公司高管股权激励与财务重述研究
dc.title.alternativeAn Empirical Research on the Relationship between Executive Equity-based Incentive and Financial Restatement in China’s Listed Firms
dc.typethesis
dc.date.replied2011-06-09
dc.description.note学位:管理学硕士
dc.description.note院系专业:管理学院会计系_会计学
dc.description.note学号:17520081151299


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