Attributes of Audit Committee Chairs，CEO Power and Earnings Quality
- 2019年第12卷 
【中文摘要】本文利用沪深主板上市公司 2008～2017 年的数据，综合专业性和影响力两大能力特征度量审计委员会召集人能力，实证考察召集人能力特征对盈余信息质量的影响。研究发现，综合能力高的召集人能显著抑制公司盈余管理水平。而随着 CEO（ chief executive officer，首席执行官）权力的增大，召集人综合能力对公司盈余管理水平的抑制效果会被削弱。进一步研究发现，召集人的专业性和公司地位可显著提高盈余信息质量，且召集人的专业性对盈余信息质量的监督作用不会受到 CEO 权力的制约。本文的研究丰富了审计委员会召集人特征方面的文献，同时也有助于为上市公司及监管机构进一步优化审计委员会召集人的任职资格，以及为公司董事会合理配置 CEO 权力提供理论依据和政策参考。 【Abstract】Based on a sample of A-share listed companies over the period of 2008-2017，this paper examines the relationship between two attributes of audit committee chairs，as measured respectively by acounting expertise and powerfulness，and earnings quality. The results suggest that the audit committee chairs’ overall qualifications based on the two attributescan significantly reduce the levels of accrual and real earnings management. However，CEO power significantly weakens the positive relation between audit committee chairs’ overall qualifications and earnings quality. Nevertheless，a firm’s industry position and the accounting expertise of its audit committee chair can substantially improve its earnings quality，and this relation is not tampered by CEO power. Our results highlight the role of the attributes of audit committee chairs in improving earnings quality and，from the regulations point of view，the importance of establishing qualification critieria for audit committee chairs of listed companies in China. Lastly，our results provide an empirical basis for the theory as well as policies that argues for the balance of CEO power in the boardroom among the board members.