The Motives of Earnings Management and Consequences of R&D Investment Reduction Under Internal and External Governance Mechanisms
- 2019年第12卷 
【中文摘要】本文检验盈余管理动机下和非盈余管理动机下的研发支出削减是否存在经济后果上的差异，以及作为内部监督机制的技术独立董事和外部监督机制的证券分析师关注能否降低研发支出削减的负面影响。本文的结果表明，相比非盈余管理动机下的研发支出削减，盈余管理动机下的研发支出削减会导致更严重的创新产出下降，同时降低企业价值，而非盈余管理动机下的研发支出 削减反而会提升企业价值。技术独立董事和证券分析师关注会显著地减轻盈余管理动机下的研发支出削减的负面影响。本文的研究结果表明，非盈余管理动机下的研发支出削减可能是正常的经营策略调整，而盈余管理动机下的研发支出削减更可能是一种机会主义行为，会降低企业的创新产出和价值，但有效的监督机制有可能减轻这一行为的负面影响。 【Abstract】This paper examines the differential economic consequences of R&D investment reduction with and without earnings management motives and whether the number of technical independent directors on the board and security analyst coverage，as the measures of internal and external governance mechanisms，respectively，can reduce the negative impact of R&D investment reduction. Our results show that R&D investment reduction with earnings management motive will lead to significant decline in innovation outputsand thus reduce firm value，whereas R&D investment reduction without earnings management motive will in fact increase firm value. The number of technical independent directors on the board and security analyst coverage will significantly mitigate the negative impact of R&D investment reduction with earnings management motive. Our results suggest that R&D investment reduction without earnings management motive may be considered as usual adjustment arising from business strategies and R&D investment reduction with earnings management motive may be attributed to opportunistic behavior，which hampers a firm's ability to innovate and thereby reduces its value. Nevertheless，effective internal and external governance mechanisms can reduce the negative impact of the opportunistic behavior.