Plantinga＇s Proper Functionism
- 厦门大学－已发表论文 
普兰廷加主张知识是被保证的真信念，而保证由三个密切相关的核心要件构成：恰当功能、设计计划和可靠性。无疑，恰当功能主义存在诸多问题，如与可靠论的区别问题、知识论的本体论蕴含问题等，这些问题的根源在于普兰廷加把为知识寻找“第三个条件”的后葛梯尔式知识论路径视为理所当然，导致其既不能坚持认知官能本身的探究，又不能在新的视角下重新审视知识的构成与本质。因此，为了弥补这两方面的缺陷，一种合理的建议就是引入当代德性知识论所实践的亚里士多德主义，即深入挖掘人的理智德性及其认知意义。Alvin Plantinga argues that knowledge is warranted true belief, and warrant consists in three closely related elements： proper function, design plan, and reliability. Undoubtedly there are many problems in proper functionalism, such as the difference with reliabilism, and the ontological implication of epistemology problems. These problems lie in the fact that he takes the post-Gettier epistemological path as granted, looking for the ＂third condition＂ of knowledge, which makes him neither insisting the investigation of cognitive faculties themselves, nor reexamining the constitution and nature of knowledge in new perspectives. Therefore, in order to make up for deficiencies in these two sides, a reasonable proposal is to introduce a kind of Aristotelianism excised by virtue epistemologists and to explore intellectual virtues and its cognitive significance.