心学还是身学?——论徐复观对庄子的误读
Philosophy of the Mind or Philosophy of the Body: On Xu Fuguan' s Misreading of Zhuangzi
Abstract
徐复观是从心学的角度来解读庄子的,所以他特别注重“心斋”概念,但心学诠释范式并不是“以庄解庄”的自然结果,而是“以儒解庄”造成的。新儒家的立场,造成了徐复观对庄子的误读。《中国人性论史·先秦篇》是寻找“心体”的一次努力,但庄子哲学的“心”在作用层,而不在本体层,心斋并不是要去寻找本心或真心,而是刳心、无心。《中国艺术精神》借用胡塞尔现象学的“纯粹意识”概念来解读心斋之心,也是不成立的。为了开出庄子思想的艺术哲学维度,较之胡塞尔的意识现象学,梅洛一庞蒂的身体现象学或许更为适用。总体上看,庄子哲学显然并不是心学。庄子哲学的身学诠释范式,迄今尚未形成,但已经有了一种趋势。毕来德的《庄子四讲》在庄子哲学的心学诠释范式之外,提示了身体哲学的诠释方向。 Xu Fuguan tried to interpret Zhuangzi from the perspective of the mind, emphasizing especially on the concept of "xinzhai." However, this interpretative paradigm is not a natural result of "adopting Zhuangzi' s perspective to interpret Zhuangzi' s teachings." Instead, he was adopting Confucianist perspective in the interpretation of Zhuangzi. His adoption of new Confucianist perspective resulted in his misreading of Zhuangzi' s teachings. His Chinese History of Human Nature in the Pre-Qin Period is an effort to find "mind and body, but in Zhuangzi' s philosophy, "mind" is func- tional, rather than ontological. The purpose ofxinzhai is not to look for the origin or essence of mind, but to empty or re- move mind. In his Chinese Art Spirit, his borrowing Husserl' s phenomenological concept of "pure consciousness" to in- terpret the concept of mind in the term xinzhai is not really valid. To figure out the philosophical dimension of Zhuangzi' s teachings, Merleau-Ponty' s body phenomenology is probably more effective. Generally speaking, Zhuangzi' s philoso- phy is evidently not one of the mind. Taking the teachings of Zhuangzi as a philosophy of the body, this interpretive para- digm, thought not yet established, is becoming a trend. Jean Frangois Billeter' s Lectures on Zhuangzi, besides offering a paradigm to interpret Zhuangzi' s teachings as a philosophy of the mind, does suggest a possibility to take Zhuangzi' s teachings as a philosophy of the body.