弗兰克对黑格尔意识哲学的批判——一种对“主体间性”理论的反思

Abstract

在当代哲学界,普遍仍将主体间性作为先验的、先于反思的避难所来应对主体哲学之悖论。德国当代哲学家弗兰克以萨特在《存在与虚无》中对黑格尔的批判为基础,对黑格尔的主体间性思想,特别是《主奴辩证》中所体现的主体间意识结构问题进行了质疑和批判。他认为,"在他者中认出自身"的"相互承认式"的主体间性理论具有某种内在的逻辑悖论,这样,任何从当下的社会关系或他者的视角来解释个体和主体性的尝试,都必然落入不得不无限解释的恶性循环。弗兰克对主体间性内在结构的本质性缺陷的认识,以及对主体性与主体间性的逻辑关系的阐释,是当前意识与自我意识问题上最前沿的洞见。

Contemporary critics who respond to the paradox of the philosophy of subjectivity and of the solipsist philosophy of consciousness still consider the inter-subjectivity to be a transcendental,pre-reflexive refuge. However,on the basis of Sartre`s critique of Hegel in Being and Nothingness,contemporary German philosophers Manfred Frank criticizes and questions Hegel`s inter-subjective thinking,particularly the structure of inter-subjective consciousness in Master-Slave Dialectics. Frank argues that the reciprocal"recognizing oneself in the other"of the inter-subjective theory has an inner logical paradox; as such,any attempt to explain the individual and subjectivity from the perspective of social relations or the other will inevitably fall into a vicious cycle of unlimited interpretation. Frank`s recognition of the essential fallacy in the inner structure of inter-subjectivity and his interpretation of the logical relationship between subjectivity and inter-subjectivity is a true insight into the contemporary problem of consciousness and self-consciousness.