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dc.contributor.author邢曙光
dc.contributor.author黄梅波
dc.date.accessioned2018-11-26T07:38:34Z
dc.date.available2018-11-26T07:38:34Z
dc.date.issued2016-01-12
dc.identifier.citation国际金融研究,2016,(01):40-50
dc.identifier.issn1006-1029
dc.identifier.otherGJJR201601005
dc.identifier.urihttps://dspace.xmu.edu.cn/handle/2288/163561
dc.description.abstract欧洲主权债务危机爆发以来,欧元区是否有必要以及如何建立财政联盟引起了学界极大关注。本文建立了一个两国新凯恩斯模型,研究不同风险分担条件下的财政联盟转移支付规则。结果发现,在黏性价格下,当非对称技术冲击时,外国向本国进行转移支付,且随国家间产品替代弹性的增加而减少,不完善的金融市场上的转移支付小于完善的金融市场;非对称成本冲击时,本国向外国进行转移支付,且随国家间产品替代弹性的增加而增加,不完善的金融市场下的转移支付大于完善的金融市场。转移支付随本土偏好的增加而增加。转移支付通过减小财政联盟各国通货膨胀波动改善各国福利。
dc.description.abstractSince the outbreak of the European sovereign debt crisis, whether the Euro zone should and how to establish a fiscal union have raised great academic attention. This paper constructs a two-country New Keynesian model to study transfer rules in a fiscal union under different risk sharing conditions. With sticky prices, when an asymmetric technology shock happens, transfer from foreign countries to home countries decreases with the increasing elasticity of product substitution between the countries. This phenomenon is less typical in incomplete financial market than in complete financial market; when an asymmetric cost-push shock happens, transfer from home countries to foreign countries increases with increasing elasticity of product substitution between the countries. This phenomenon is more obvious in incomplete financial market than in complete financial market. Transfer increases with the rising regional home bias. It improves the welfare of each country in a fiscal union by decreasing the volatility of inflation.
dc.description.sponsorship2013年国家社科基金一般项目“援助有效性、发展有效性与中国对外援助的质量研究”(项目批准号:13BJL054)资助
dc.language.isozh_CN
dc.subject风险分担
dc.subject财政联盟
dc.subject转移支付
dc.subject新凯恩斯模型
dc.subjectRisk Sharing
dc.subjectFiscal Union
dc.subjectTransfer
dc.subjectNew Keynesian Model
dc.title论不同风险分担条件下的欧洲财政联盟转移支付
dc.title.alternativeResearch on the Fiscal Transfer in the European Fiscal Union under Different Risk Sharing Conditions
dc.typeArticle


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