Legal Environment, Political Connections and Irregularity Investigation： Empirical Evidences from A-Share Market
- 管理学院－已发表论文 
采用部分可观测的Bivariate Probit模型,系统地研究企业所处的法治环境、政治关联类型以及产权性质对其违规行为的影响。实证结果表明：法治环境的改善和企业的政治关联都能降低公司违规的概率,且这一效应主要体现在官员类政治关联中;从企业的产权性质来看,国有企业的官员类政治关联能够降低企业违规被稽查的概率,而法治环境的改善能够降低企业的违规倾向,从而削弱了政治关联的作用效果;对于民营企业,虽然法治环境的改善同样降低了其违规倾向,但政治关联对其违规被稽查的概率没有产生影响。By applying the partially observable Bivariate Probit model, this paper systematically studies the impact of the legal environment, the types of political connections and the nature of prop- erty rights in which the enterprises exist on their illegal behaviors. The empirical results show that the improvement of the legal environment and the political connections of the enterprises can reduce the probability of the company＇ s violations, and this effect is mainly reflected in the political rela- tions of the officials. From the point of the nature of the property rights of the enterprise, the offi- cers＇ political connections of the state-owned enterprises can reduce the probability of being investi- gated and punished for their irregularities, while the improvement of the legal environment can reduce the tendency of their violations, thus weakening the effect of political connections. As for private en- terprises, although the improvement of the legal environment can also reduce the tendency of their vi- olations, yet the political connections have no impact on the probability of being investigated or pun- ished for their violations.