The Controlling Shareholders Share Pledges and the Information Disclosure of Listed Companies
- 管理学院－已发表论文 
本文以2007—2015年间A股上市公司为研究对象,以临时公告为切入点,在区分公告消息性质的基础上,实证检验控股股东股权质押是否会影响上市公司信息披露。研究发现,与不存在控股股东股权质押的上市公司相比,存在控股股东股权质押的上市公司将披露更多的好消息,而且好消息更可能在交易日披露,坏消息更可能在非交易日披露。在进一步分析中本文还发现,该现象只存在无投资者关注和非连续质押的样本中;只有在股价下跌临近平仓线时,控股股东才干预上市公司信息披露,该行为能显著提升股价,化解股价下跌的危机,但与此同时,这也加剧了股价波动性和降低了股价信息含量。This paper use A-share listed companies as the research object between 2007 and 2015,this paper takes temporary announcement as the breakthrough point,distinguishing announcement news properties,Empirical test whether the controlling shareholders share pledges intervene the information disclosure of listed companies,we found,compared to non-controlling shareholders share pledges,the listed company of the controlling shareholders with share pledges to disclose more good news,and the good news is more likely disclosure during the trading day and bad news is more likely disclosure during the non-trading day. In the further analysis,we also found the relationship is not significantly in samples of pledge of investor attention and repeat pledge,only when stock price fell near open line,the controlling shareholders to intervene information disclosure. This behavior can be significantly increased share price and avoid the crisis,but the behavior is also increase the stock price volatility and reduces the share price information content.