Characteristics and Behavioral Logic of Local Government’s Illegal Land Use
- 公共事务－已发表论文 
地方政府土地违法具有阶段性周期反弹的趋势特征、东部比重降低而中西部比重上升的空间特征以及组 织层级越高、大面积违法越严重的主体特征.基于中央一地方土地违法监察的完全信息静态博弈模型,分析发现地 方政府土地违法行为与土地监察机制、政绩考核制度和财政体制密切相关,既有土地财政与官员晋升制度提供的 内在激励,也有违法成本低与权力制约失衡的制度软约束,是既定制度安排下中央一地方博弈的产物.The local government, illegal land use is characterized by periodic cycle rebound in which the proportion of local governments in the eastern region is going down while the proportion of local governments in the middle and western regions is going up. The higher the organizational hierarchy is, the more serious the illegality of large area land use is. Based on a static game model with complete information about land use and supervision between central and local govern-ments, the article finds that the illegal land use of local governments is closely related to the systems of land supervision, bureaucratic performance assessment and finance. All in all,the illegal land use of local governments is caused by eco-nomic and political interests with the soft constraint of systems resulting in low cost of illegal land use and imbalanced power restriction. It is the product of central-local game under the condition of the given institutional arrangement.