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dc.contributor.author吴旭阳
dc.date.accessioned2018-11-26T07:00:37Z
dc.date.available2018-11-26T07:00:37Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.citation自然辩证法通讯,2017,(20):117-124
dc.identifier.issn1000-0763
dc.identifier.other10.15994/j.1000-0763.2017.02.018
dc.identifier.urihttps://dspace.xmu.edu.cn/handle/2288/161664
dc.description.abstract双方合作博弈所证明的最佳行为策略是"一报还一报"。这种具备合作与惩罚的善良策略也符合最基本意义上的公平。从这个角度看,司法的本质就是公平的第三方惩罚或裁判,是"一报还一报"的高级版本,是人类合作公平的体现。本文尝试从司法产生的情境基础进行研究,首先探讨"双方合作博弈"的情境,推导出双方博弈的最佳策略模式是"一报还一报"。其次,进而推导出"第三方裁判"是大规模合作博弈的最佳或较优的群体策略,是"一报还一报"的升级版。最后,对于"第三方裁判"在实践中可能出现的最重要的缺陷进行研究,并探讨对该缺陷的解决方式——重返"一报还一报"的惩罚、监督或制衡。
dc.description.abstract"Tit for tat" strategy is proved to be the best behavior strategy in "person to person" cooperative game contest. This kind of strategy which combined both cooperation and punishment aspects conforms to the basic fairness as well. From this perspective, the nature of judiciary is the impartial punishment or judgment of the third-party, which is the advanced version of "tit for tat" and the embodiment of cooperative justice. This paper tends to carry on research on the basis of the situation in which judiciary arises. It firstly deduces that the best strategy pattern of"cooperative game between person to person" is "tit for tat". Then, it reaches a conclusion that "third-party judge" is the best or better group evolutionary strategy in extensive cooperative game, and is an updated version of "tit for tat". Last, the paper studies the most important defect of third-party judge which may appear in practice, and tries to probe into the solution returning to the punishment, supervision and balance of "tit for tat".
dc.description.sponsorship“教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(项目编号:14YJC820055)《司法公正之行为实验研究》;福建省软科学项目《企业技术创新的激励政策之实证研究——调查与行为实验的方法》(项目编号:2014R0085);厦门大学人文社会科学“校长基金创新团队”课题《法理学前沿问题研究》(课题编号:20720171006);
dc.language.isozh_CN
dc.subject司法裁判
dc.subject公平
dc.subject演化稳定策略
dc.subject行为实验
dc.subjectBehavioral experiment
dc.title从演化博弈看“司法裁判”的本质和完善——行为策略实验的视角
dc.title.alternativeNature and Perfection of Judicial Judgment Through Evolutionary Game Theory: From the Perspective of Experiments of Behavioral Strategy
dc.typeArticle


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