Nature and Perfection of Judicial Judgment Through Evolutionary Game Theory: From the Perspective of Experiments of Behavioral Strategy
- 法学院－已发表论文 
双方合作博弈所证明的最佳行为策略是"一报还一报"。这种具备合作与惩罚的善良策略也符合最基本意义上的公平。从这个角度看,司法的本质就是公平的第三方惩罚或裁判,是"一报还一报"的高级版本,是人类合作公平的体现。本文尝试从司法产生的情境基础进行研究,首先探讨"双方合作博弈"的情境,推导出双方博弈的最佳策略模式是"一报还一报"。其次,进而推导出"第三方裁判"是大规模合作博弈的最佳或较优的群体策略,是"一报还一报"的升级版。最后,对于"第三方裁判"在实践中可能出现的最重要的缺陷进行研究,并探讨对该缺陷的解决方式——重返"一报还一报"的惩罚、监督或制衡。＂Tit for tat＂ strategy is proved to be the best behavior strategy in ＂person to person＂ cooperative game contest. This kind of strategy which combined both cooperation and punishment aspects conforms to the basic fairness as well. From this perspective, the nature of judiciary is the impartial punishment or judgment of the third-party, which is the advanced version of ＂tit for tat＂ and the embodiment of cooperative justice. This paper tends to carry on research on the basis of the situation in which judiciary arises. It firstly deduces that the best strategy pattern of＂cooperative game between person to person＂ is ＂tit for tat＂. Then, it reaches a conclusion that ＂third-party judge＂ is the best or better group evolutionary strategy in extensive cooperative game, and is an updated version of ＂tit for tat＂. Last, the paper studies the most important defect of third-party judge which may appear in practice, and tries to probe into the solution returning to the punishment, supervision and balance of ＂tit for tat＂.