Regulation Paradox of Informal Finance and Its Solution: Route Selection of Legal Regulation and Soft Law Governance
- 法学院－已发表论文 
民间金融的治理难题实质上内含了两种规制模式的失灵:单一的硬法规制存在阿喀琉斯式的疑似佯谬,无法走出国家中心治理观下监管反向诱致民间金融地下化发展这一困境;纯粹的软法规制则存在马歇尔冲突造成的真佯谬,无法解决社会网络治理一维观产生的民间金融声誉执行脱域问题。前者肇因于民间金融的外部监管无法消解金融抑制带来的法外运行激励,后者则始于内部软法治理有限性与现代民间金融扩张性的冲突。遵循软硬法混合规制机理,民间金融应借助差别化利率管理、选择性登记准入等手段完成对硬法规制的激励补强,通过司法强制执行完成软法规制的增程。然而,混合规制模式自身也难以克服层级阴影下国家干预与营商激励的冲突,需要通过政府与社会网络的协同共建来形塑新型的民间金融软硬法合作规制模式。The regulation dilemma of informal finance actually reflects the failures of two regulation modes. Due to the Achilles-type＇ s suspected paradox, single legal regulation model eouldn＇ t deal with the problems that state-centered governance reversely induced informal finance to become underground finance, and single soft law regulation would be unable to solve the reputation execution problem because of the true paradox caused by Marshall Conflict. These problems would be attributed to the financial repression, limitation of internal gov- ernance as well as expansion of modern informal finance. On the basis of theoretical mixed regulation model, incentive reform of legal regulation mode should be implemented with the supporting mechanisms such as differ- entiated interest-rate management, selective registration, and soft-law governance should extend its range by ju- dicial enforcement. However, such mode couldn＇ t deal with the conflict between state intervention in financial order and the private interests of business operators. Therefore, it is necessary to shape cooperation regulation model of informal finance by community-channel negotiation and market-oriented interest transactions.