Introduction to the concept of no-evidence on individual cases： Taking the case of Nie Shubin as an example
- 法学院－已发表论文 
聂树斌案复查再审的艰难并非理论偏误所致,但是为迎合司法实践提出所谓的聂树斌有罪和无罪＂四六开＂的概率论解释,反倒成为聂案各方各取所需的借口。通过＂无证据＂概念的引入,案件事实论证的成立与否可以转化为有、无证据的真相判断。对于所谓＂证据确实充分＂的已决案件,即便是因为真凶出现的偶然情形被认为的是错案,亦需要重新审视曾经的＂证据＂,这并非是以一个糟糕的论证代替另一个劣质的论证,而是要深入到糟糕的论证细节之中,将曾经的不确实、不充分的、非法获取需要排除乃至虚假和捏造的＂旧证据＂还原为＂无证据＂,同时运用＂新证据＂把＂旧证据＂证伪为＂无证据＂,才能跳脱所谓的既有罪又无罪的概率论陷阱。The difficulty in review and retrial of Shubin Nie Case does not result from theoretical errors, but is a probabilistic interpretation catering to judicial practice with a 4：6 guilt-to-innocence ratio of Nie, which in turn provides different parties to this case with excuses as they need. With the introduction of the concept of Noevidence, a factual argumentation of a case with or without success can be transformed into truth determination with or without evidence. A decided case with so-called ＂concrete and suffi cient＂ evidence which turns out to be a erroneously-convicted case for the accidental appearance of the real perpetrator also make it necessary to reexamine the ＂former evidence＂. Instead of replacing a bad argumentation with another same one, we should dig deeper into the details of those bad argumentations, reduce the former inaccurate, insuffi cient, illegally-obtained and inadmissible, or even false and fabricated ＂old evidences＂ into ＂no-evidence＂, and falsify the old evidences into ＂noevidence＂ by new ones, so as to jump out of the so-called probability trap of being both guilty and not guilty.