司法中的常识运用：从“小偷摔死失主有罪”报道出发

Abstract

“小偷摔死”让失主承担罪责或者责任总感觉是一个违反法律常识的问题，然而，或许首先要拷问的是“小偷怎么就摔死了呢”。这种小概率事件超出了当事人的预见范围，但是同样可能会让我们质疑当事人一方提供的案件信息的合理性。因此，诉讼程序的启动和运转可能同时要考虑证据和常识因素。虽然，外在舆论所支撑的“常识”有其合理的成分，但是，它并不确定甚至可能干扰正常的诉讼活动，只有通过法定的渠道进入司法之中才使得对常识的考量具有合法性。此外，还可能存在良心裁判这种难以以法律进行规制的自由裁量余地。

The claim that the owner was guilty of the thief falling down to the ground dead seems anti - law. The first question that comes to mind is how the thief fell down to the ground dead. The probability was so small that it was beyond the client＇ s anticipation. Yet, similarly it would make us question the＇ rationality of information by the client concerning the case. Therefore, the litigation pro- cedures should start and proceed according to the evidences and common sense. Though the common sense supported by the external public opinions contains elements of rationality, it is indefinite and may even interfere with normal litigation activities. Only through legal channels in justice can common sense be evaluated in terms of rationality. Also, it may be hard to freely arbi- trate conscience from the angle of law.