Who Hires Politically Connected Independent Directors? The Perspective of the Value of GUANXI
- 2016年第9卷 
【摘要】中共中央组织部 18 号文件引发的官员独立董事辞职潮侧面反映了官员独立董事在我国上市公司中广泛存在。本文以2011--2013 年沪深两市上市公司为样本，在全样本基础上，将样本按照产权性质划分为国有企业和民营企业，实证研究了中国上市公司聘请官员独立董事的可能性与产权保护水平、政府干预水平、金融发展水平等正式制度环境以及公司是否进入垄断行业之间的关系，分析了上市公司选聘官员独立董事的内在逻辑。本文细化了独立董事的关系资源职能，为理解中国上市公司聘请官员独立董事的现象提供了新的视角。 【Absract】 It is well-known that politically connected independent directors sit on the boards of publicly listed companies in China, but little research is focused on the motives of the companies that hire these directors. Using a manually collected dataset from 2011 to 2013, this paper examines the roles of the formal institutional environments (i.e., local property right protections, government interventions, and financial developments) and the intentions of listed companies to enter monopolistic industries in the companies’ decisions on selecting politically connected independent directors. The results show that the non-state-owned listed companies are more likely to hire politically connected independent directors when the local property right protections are poor, government interventions are frequent, and the financial market is underdeveloped. In contrast, the state-owned listed companies do not have this preference. In monopolistic industries, we find that it is more likely for the collectively listed companies and the state-owned listed companies to have politically connected independent directors. This paper provides evidence on the value of politically connected independent directors through GUANXI and provide an explanation for why the listed companies in China hire politically connected independent directors.