On the View of Justification in Foundationalism
- 人文学院－已发表论文 
作为知识的一个基本要素,确证理论是当代西方知识论所集中研究的一个主要问题。"确证"概念主要包含两个方面:一是其规范性的特征;二是它与"真"的联系。一般认为,X是得到确证的,仅当它已经或至少能够通过引用一些理由来进行证明,这就涉及到作为理由的信念与被确证的信念之间的支持关系。从结构上看,确证似乎形成一个无限回溯的系列,基础主义要解决的就是确证上的无限回溯问题。基础主义这个"阿基米德"点遭到了反基础主义的批判,当然反基础主义本身在西方也受到了挑战。As a basic element of knowledge, the theory of justification is one of the main subjects focused on in the study on contemporary western epistemology. The conception of justification contains mainly two aspects: first, its normative feature, secondly, its relation to "truth". Scholars at large conceive that X is justified only when it has been or at least been proved by quoting any reason, which involves the support relationship between the belief as reason and justified belief. Viewed from its structure, justification seems to form a series of regressive arguments, and what Foundationalism is to resolve is the very question of limitless regressive arguments. However, the Archimedes' point of Foundationalism has been criticized by Anti-Foundationalism. And surely also Anti-Foundationalism, too, faces challenges in the west.