A Contractual Analysis of Property Right Diversification of State-Owned Banks
- 经济学院－已发表论文 
企业的本质是一组合约的联结,合约的不完全性要求对企业产权合约中的剩余权利做出安排。本文将企业合约理论应用于对国有银行的分析,认为产权规则是企业重要的激励制度安排。国有商业银行产权国有的性质所导致的大量“中国式不完全合约”和“要挟行为”(Hold-up)使其处于低效率的状态。在产权多元化改革过程中,最重要的是必须在国有金融产权领域引入合约交易和实施机制,使国家中止或退出产权合约的威胁是可以置信的,这样才能实现产权效率的最优配置。The nature of enterprises is a junction of a series of contracts, incompleteness of which means that residual rights should be arranged as incentives. Applying the theory of contract to the analysis of the reform of China's state-owned banks, this paper proposes that the emergence of various "Chinese style incomplete contracts" and "hold-up" is the source of their inefficiency. In the process of diversification of state-owned property right, it is important that transaction of property right contract and its implementation mechanism should be introduced, so as to make the threat credible that the state may stop or quit from the contract. Only by doing so will the efficiency of property rights be rationally allocated.