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dc.contributor.author杨继国
dc.contributor.author童香英
dc.date.accessioned2017-11-14T02:15:11Z
dc.date.available2017-11-14T02:15:11Z
dc.date.issued2006-07-17
dc.identifier.citation中国工业经济,2006,(07):23-29
dc.identifier.issn1006-480X
dc.identifier.otherGGYY200607002
dc.identifier.urihttps://dspace.xmu.edu.cn/handle/2288/145980
dc.description.abstract当前,我国国有企业改革中最重要的问题是在公司治理模式中缺少职工的有效监督作用,从而导致国有资产大量流失,阻碍国有企业改革的深化与推进。通过建立一个简单数理模型,本文证明现有国有企业治理结构在不能解决有效监督的前提下,对企业管理者的“激励机制”可能成为“逆向激励”。将职工监督机制引入监督模型能很好地解决这一难题。本文还探讨了职工行使控制权的理论依据,并以德国的“参与制”进行经验检验,从理论与实践两方面论证职工剩余控制权的可能性与可行性。
dc.description.abstractThe most important problem in our SOE reform is short of effective supervision of workers in the corporate governance,which causes the runoff of state-owned property in great quantities in some enterprises and obstructs the reform of SOE.Based on a simple model,we find that the incentive mechanism may become adverse in the absence of effective monitoring and supervision in the current state.The key premise we propose is that introducing workers' supervision to monitoring function would provide a new perspective and solution of the current principal-agent problem.We also address the theoretical basis for workers' control enforcement and make the empirical analysis by taking German codetermination as a study case,wherein we examine the probability and feasibility of workers' residual control rights separately from theoretical and practice aspect.
dc.language.isozh_CN
dc.subject职工剩余控制权
dc.subject监督效率
dc.subject国有企业治理难题
dc.subjectworkers' residual control rights
dc.subjectmonitoring effectiveness
dc.subjectSOE problems in corporate governance
dc.title逆向激励、国有企业监督与职工剩余控制权
dc.title.alternativeIncentive Adverseness,SOE Supervision and Residual Control Rights of Workers
dc.typeArticle


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