Do Institutional Investors Collude with Listed Companies: Analysis Based on Non-voluntary Management Turnover and Selection of Succession
- 经济学院－已发表论文 
机构投资者在公司治理中究竟扮演的是"有效监督者",还是"旁观者",抑或"合谋者"的角色理论界对此一直存在争议。本文选择高管更替这一研究视角,以2004-2008年间沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验机构投资者持股对高管非自愿变更以及继任选择决策的影响,以此考察机构投资者在公司治理中的角色。结果显示,机构持股比例越高,公司高管因绩差被撤职的可能性越小,而且即使高管被更换后,公司也更倾向于从内部聘任继任者。进一步的研究发现,高管被撤换后公司业绩显著提高。其中,从外部聘任继任者的公司业绩有明显改善,而从内部选聘继任者的公司经营业绩没有转机。以上结果说明在高管更替事件上,机构投资者扮演的是上市公司管理层"合谋者"的角色。分组样本的结果表明,机构投资者的合谋者角色仅限于在总经理更替决策上具有显著的影响力,而对董事长的更替作用有限。而且,公司的股权集中度越高,机构投资者的作用越不显著。The growing up of global institutional investors is an important trend in the financial field in the past thirty years. According to the statistical data until 2009, institutional investors have accounted for half of the circulated market equity in the capital market, and up to sixty percent of the listed companies have institutional investors as their first ten greatest shareholders. Do institutional investors possess ability of corporate governance in our country? It is a new topic which needs urgent research in the corporate governance field. Which role do institutional investors play in corporate governance, “effective monitor”, “onlooker”, or “colluder”? From the existed academic results, we can see that scholars have tried to explore the role institutional investors play in corporate governance from all points and directions. However, the conclusions are different. Therefore, it is necessary to choose a new research point in order to enrich academic achievements about institutional investors’ role in corporate governance. By using Ashare listed companies in the period of the year 2004 and 2008 as research sample, this article empirically tests the impact of institutional investors on the decision of non-voluntary management turnover and succession, to confirm the role of institutional investors in corporate governance. The results show that, the more institution investors hold shares; the sensitivity of management turnover to accounting performance is lower. Furthermore, even after management turnover, inside succession is more likely for firms with more institutional investors share-holding. We document performance improvements subsequent to non voluntary turnover and outside succession, while changes in earnings performance are not significant for inside succession. All these results show that institutional investors play the role of management’s “colluder” in nonvoluntary turnover and succession. Grouping sample results show that institutional investors have only impact on CEO turnover and succession, not on the chairman of the board. Moreover, the higher the firm’s ownership concentration is, the influence of institutional investors is more insignificant. From the above conclusion, we can suggest that regulators should set up correlative system to regulate the behavior of institutional investors, strengthen the penalty, increase costs and risks of collusion, and put an end to the possibility of collusion between institutional investors and executives of listed companies as far as possible.