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基于人性假设的盈余管理博弈分析
Game Analysis of Enterprise's Earnings Management on the Basis of Human Nature Hypothesis

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基于人性假设的盈余管理博弈分析.pdf (147.3Kb)
Date
2005-05-25
Author
刘长青
彭数学
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  • 管理学院-已发表论文 [5969]
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Abstract
从经济学关于人性假设及其博弈分析来看,盈余管理可分为效率性盈余管理和机会主义盈余管理两类。效率性盈余管理是正和博弈,它会激发管理者的生产性寻利行为;机会主义盈余管理是寻租行为与常和博弈,它具有会计后果。利润操纵则纯粹是一种寻租行为,是对社会资源的负和博弈。因此,相关部门应当采取措施以激励效率性盈余管理的发展,正确引导机会主义盈余管理,严厉制止利润操纵。
 
According to human nature hypothesis of economics and game theory, ear nings management can be roughly divided into two types: efficient earnings manag ement and opportunistic earnings management. Efficient earnings management is a positive-sum game, and will leads to management's profit-seeking actions. Opport unistic earnings management is a sort of rent-seeking actions and a zero-sum gam e. Profit manipulating is absolutely a sort of rent-seeking actions and a negati ve-sum game to social resource. So, the relevant governmental departments should take measures to encourage the development of efficient earnings management, co rrectly guide opportunistic earnings management, and sternly prohibit profit man ipulating.
 
Citation
财经理论与实践,2005,(03):69-72
URI
https://dspace.xmu.edu.cn/handle/2288/140242

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