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dc.contributor.author杜兴强
dc.date.accessioned2017-11-14T01:08:59Z
dc.date.available2017-11-14T01:08:59Z
dc.date.issued2004-09-03
dc.identifier.citation财经研究,2004,(09):75-85
dc.identifier.issn1001-9952
dc.identifier.otherCJYJ200409008
dc.identifier.urihttps://dspace.xmu.edu.cn/handle/2288/139953
dc.description.abstract文章以公司治理为背景、以会计发展史为证据,以博弈论为分析工具,着力阐述公司治理演进过程中,会计信息披露监管的制度性结构的形成过程。文章首先解释"保密、保密、再保密"惯例的形成原因,并论证市场机制虽可确保企业公开披露会计信息,然而却无法保证会计信息披露的质量。文章还针对股权分散的公司治理特征的现实,解释为什么投资者不愿对企业的管理当局进行监督,最终促使会计信息披露监管机制的出现。
dc.description.abstractBased on corporate governance,with accounting history as evidence and game theory as analyzing tool, the paper discusses the forming process of institution structure of regulating accounting information disclosure. First,the paper explains the reason why the convention "secret,secret and more secret" came into being;second,it demonstrates that although market mechanism can ensure public accounting information disclosure, it can not ensure its quality;finally,in accordance with the reality of disperse stock features of corporate governance, the paper explains why the unwillingness on the part of investors to supervise corporate management finally leads to the appearance of regulation mechanism of accounting information disclosure to ensure the quality of accounting information。
dc.description.sponsorship国家自然科学基金(70302012);; 教育部社科博士点基金(03JB790009)
dc.language.isozh_CN
dc.subject公司治理
dc.subject会计信息
dc.subject监管
dc.subject博弈分析
dc.subject历史证据
dc.subjectcorporate governance
dc.subjectaccounting information
dc.subjectregulation
dc.subjectgame analysis
dc.subjecthistorical evidences
dc.title公司治理演进与会计信息披露监管——博弈分析与历史证据
dc.title.alternativeCorporate Governance Development and Regulation of Accounting Information Disclosure ——Game Analysis and Historical Evidences
dc.typeArticle


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