Towards the Signalling function of accounting firms' choice
- 管理学院－已发表论文 
由于管理当局与投资者之间存在信息不对称,管理当局有动机通过选择高质量的著名大事务所进行审计,以传递其关于公司质量的私人信息,减少低定价。但在我国,企业缺乏聘请高质量事务所审计的动力,这不利于证券市场的健康发展。应改善注册会计师的执业环境,促使管理当局聘请高质量事务所进行审计。The information between management and investors is asymmetric. Management have incentives to signalprivate information about quality of company by choose high quality auditors to decrease underpricing. Generally, bigand good reputation accounting firms can provide high quality audit services. But in China, listed companies oftenchoose low quality auditors, which is harmful to the development of capital market. We should take steps to improvethe environment of auditing, and encourage companies to hire big and famous accounting firms.