The Information Content of the Scheduled Disclosure Dates for Periodical Reports
- 管理学院－已发表论文 
沪深两交易所从2002年初开始对外公布上市公司向其预约的定期报告披露日期,本文研究了这一日期是否包含对投资者有用的信息。我们发现,在交易所公布预约日期时,公司的预约披露日期越早,则其异常回报越高,反之则低。市场的这种反应可以用随后公布的实际会计业绩好坏加以解释。我们还考察了市场的这种反应在横截面上的差异,对发布过”好消息”的预警公告及规模较大的公司,市场的反应程度较低;同时还发现预约披露日期的信息含量并未被”坏消息”的业绩预警公告所取代,这说明预约披露日期对“坏消息”的预警公司起到了进一步的证实作用。Since early 2002, Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges began to publish the disclosure dates of periodical reports scheduled by the listed companies. This study examines whether such dates contain information useful to the investors. We find that the earlier the scheduled disclosure dates, the higher the abnormal returns when the exchanges publish these dates. The market's responses can be explained by subsequently disclosed earnings performance. We also examine the cross-sectional variations of market's responses. The responses are weaker for firms that have announced "good news" performance warnings and large firms. However, the information content of the scheduled dates is not preempted by the "bad news" warnings announcements, suggesting such information confirms the "bad news" warnings announcements.