Cash Holding and Operating Performance of Rights Issue Companies
- 管理学院－已发表论文 
以 1 999年实施配股的公司为样本 ,分析了上市公司配股后现金的持有状况、持有形式及配股前后公司经营业绩的变化。发现在配股当年 ,公司配股所得现金多以货币资金和短期投资的形式存在 ,次年投入使用 ,但有 2 6 %的公司变更投资项目。公司在配股当年的经营业绩较前一年显著下降 ,在现金投入使用的当年 ,业绩较前一年无明显变化 ,但在现金投入使用的下一年 ,经营业绩又显著下降 ;而且通过横截面研究发现在现金富余公司中现金持有量越多公司业绩则越差。表明配股公司的经理人存在滥用配股资金的行为 ,符合自由现金流的代理成本假说。In this paper the listing companies' cash holding and operating performance around rights issue are analyzed taking the companies that issued rights in 1999 as the sample. We conclude that the cash of rights issue companies were money and short-term security in the year of rights issue and invested in next year but 26 percent of the sample changed their investment. The operating performance decreased sharply in the year of rights issue and kept stable in the year of investment, but decreased in the next year of investment again. Above all in the cash-rich companies the performance got worse, the cash kept more. We think the management inefficiently used the cash of rights issue, which took an accord with the agency cost of free cash flow hypothesis.