上市公司举债、股东财富与股市效应关系的实证研究

Abstract

本文就上市公司举债对股东财富的影响及股市效应进行了理论分析和实证检验 ,发现中国上市公司举债所产生的效应恰恰与西方国家相反 ,即借款比率与股票风险 β存在负相关关系。进一步的分析发现 ,借款负债对企业经营业绩和股东财富的波动有稳定的作用 ,但随着公司的业绩水平和市场竞争能力的变化 ,这种稳定作用的显著程度也不相同。

This paper investigates into the effects of the listed companies' liabilities behavior on their shareholders' wealth,and then examines this by empirical method.The investigation finds that company's liabilities ratio negatively interrelates with stock risk β,that is contrary to the western researches.Further study reveals that,when the market economy was in prosperous position,the shareholders' wealth which should have been increased from high debt,was restrained by the increased managers moral hazards and agent costs caused by the administrative and unrational behavior of company's raising money from bank,and that when the market economy was in depression liability may provide incentive on managers in a certain extent,and holds back the descent of shareholders' wealth because of high debt.So,raising money from banks may stabilize the fluctuation of company's earnings and shareholders' wealth,but the degree of stabilization varies from the listed company's operational power and its competitive power.