Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author陈向民
dc.date.accessioned2017-11-14T01:07:38Z
dc.date.available2017-11-14T01:07:38Z
dc.date.issued2000-04-03
dc.identifier.citation财经研究,2000,(04):35-39
dc.identifier.issn1001-9952
dc.identifier.otherCJYJ200004006
dc.identifier.urihttps://dspace.xmu.edu.cn/handle/2288/139161
dc.description.abstract本文讨论了在企业契约的影响下会计政策选择的机制安排。由于企业契约具有的交易特别性及可塑性使得会计政策的选择具有某些产权的特性 ,这样 ,由此产生的经济后果吸引企业的所有者不会愿意完全将这一权力让渡给管理当局 ,而往往采用大股东 -管理当局共同控制的方法以防止道德风险和交易胁迫。
dc.description.abstractIn this paper,we argued that the pattern in which management of firm totally occupied the right to choose accounting policy is unjustifiable. Due to the transaction specific and plastic of the firm contract,economic consequences of accounting policy choice makes it become a certain of property right which can affect interests of entities related. Thus,owner,especially those controlled the firm,would share this right with management to protect from moral hazard and hold up.
dc.language.isozh_CN
dc.subject会计政策选择
dc.subject交易特别性
dc.subject可塑性
dc.subjectaccounting policy choice
dc.subjecttransaction-specific
dc.subjectplastic
dc.title企业契约与会计选择
dc.title.alternativeContract of Firm and Accounting Policy Choice
dc.typeArticle


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record