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公允价值信息披露的管制安排
Regulatory Arrangement for Disclosure of Fair Value Information

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公允价值信息披露的管制安排.pdf (526.7Kb)
Date
2008-11-15
Author
孙丽影
杜兴强
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  • 管理学院-已发表论文 [5969]
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Abstract
公允价值信息具有假设性、未实现性和非客观性等特征。本文运用两个博弈模型,说明了保障公允价值信息的决策有用性必须依赖于有效的管制安排。管制安排的目标是通过提高识别经理欺诈的概率和合理化对欺诈的惩罚来保障公允价值信息的决策有用性。
 
Fair value information possesses features of hypotheticalness, unrealization, and non-objectivity.The paper uses two game theory models to demonstrate that, in order to guarantee the decision usefulness of fair value information, we need an effective regulatory arrangement. The objective of the regulatory arrangement is to guarantee the decision usefulness of fair value information by increasing the probability of identifying managers' fraud and exercising effective punishment against managers' fraud.
 
Citation
会计研究,2008,(11):31-36,99
URI
https://dspace.xmu.edu.cn/handle/2288/139076

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