审计的二重价值:鉴证价值和保险价值

Abstract

目前审计理论界存在四种审计需求理论——代理成本假说、信号传递假说、信息价值假说以及保险假说,本文试图将四种理论统一在同一理论框架下分析。根据文献,代理成本假说和信号传递假说两种理论可以统一在信息价值假说的理论框架下讨论。由于当前文献中信息价值特指传递审计质量(即鉴证质量)信息,而不包含传递保险信息。为避免理解上的偏差,本文将信息价值另称为鉴证价值。基于此,提出了审计二部价值理论,即对鉴证价值和保险价值两种假说的综合。

Four sources of demand for hiring auditing services have been proposed in existing literatures: to reduce agency costs (agency cost hypothesis), to signal outsiders about company's prospects (signaling hypothesis), to indicate the value of the audit in improving resource allocation (informational value hypothesis) and to provide a potential source of loss recovery for investors (insurance hypothesis). Although considerable research has been done in the area, each source of demand is often discussed in respective theory, and even some are considered to be incompatible with each other. The objective of this dissertation is to integrate above-mentioned theories and formulate uniform theoretic model of the `demand for audit services.