我国中小投资者法律保护与控制权私利关系实证检验

Abstract

本文以1994—2003年间深沪两市发生的股权转让事件为研究对象,用控制权私利水平衡量法律保护的结果和效率,实证检验我国法律制度的完善是否起到保护中小投资者的作用。研究发现:我国证券市场存在较高的控制权私利水平,在中小投资者法律保护的不同阶段,控制权私利存在显著差异;总体上,中小投资者法律保护能起到降低控制权私利作用;1999年以前法律保护较差的阶段,投资者法律保护并没有发挥降低控制权私利的作用;但在2000年之后,法律保护逐渐发挥作用,控股股东获得的控制权私利不断降低。

This paper examines whether the legal system can effectively protect minority shareholders in China,by sampling 951 transactions of untradeble shares in Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange during the 1994 to 2003 period.The empirical results show:①there exist significant private benefits of control in the listed companies in China,and the levels of private benefit at the different periods of legal investor protection are significantly different from each other.②as the level of legal investor protection improves,the private benefits of control decrease.③in the 1994 to 1998 period,with poor legal investor protection,legal investor protection does not significantly affect private benefits of control.However,after 2000,legal investor protection begins to play its role in curbing the controlling shareholders' ability to get private benefits of control.