The Empirical Study on Behavior of Committing Fraud in Listed Companies: Evidence from the Characteristics of Board of Directors
- 管理学院－已发表论文 
本文以2001-2005年间因为违规行为被监管层公开谴责、公开批评或公开处罚的195家A股上市公司及其195家配对公司为研究对象,应用二分类Probit回归、广义线性模型和排序Probit回归分析方法,研究董事会特征是否会影响公司违规的发生概率、发生频率和严重程度等违规行为。结果表明,董事会规模过大会降低工作效率;独立董事比例越高,公司经营越规范;审计委员会的设立可以在一定程度上监督约束公司行为。美中不足的是,它们在统计上均不显著,这可能是因为我国的上市公司治理制度建设才刚刚起步,其治理作用尚未充分显现。与代理理论相矛盾,关于董事会领导结构的实证结果支持现代管家理论,董事长兼任总经理的公司越不容易违规,违规程度越轻微,这可能意味着董事会是一个复杂的体系以至单一的理论无法完全诠释其运营原理。此外,董事会会议越频繁并不意味着董事越勤勉,更可能是公司隐患越多。本文结论将为上市公司董事会的设置乃至公司治理机制建设提供经验证据和启示。This paper examines 195 A-share listed companies which received enforcement actions from the regulators in China due to committing fraud spanning from 2001 to 2005 and the cor- responding 195 control samples. Applying Binary Probit regression, General Linear Model and Ordered Probit regression analysis, it investigated the relation between the board characteristics and the properties of corporate fraud, surrogated by the probability of oc- currence, the frequency and the degree of fraud. The study finds that, firstly, despite of the statistical insignificance, larger board size will reduce the efficiency of the board, whereas larger proportion of independent directors will standardize the operation of listed companies. And, to a certain extent, establishing the Auditing Com- mittee can regulate the information disclosure behavior of listed companies. This means that the construction of corporate gover- nance system in listed companies just started several years before in China, and up to the present, the function of corporate governance mechanism hasn’t yet manifested sufficiently. Secondly, contrary to the Agency theory, the results show that the general manager duality significantly helps to reduce fraud and alleviate the degree of fraud, which supports the Stewardship theory. It seems that the board is so complex that simple theory can’t explain its operation principles. Thirdly, the high frequency of board meetings does not mean that the directors are more likely to perform their duties diligently, but to react to the poor performance of a company. Our findings have implications for the design of appropriate board and corporate gov- ernance systems for listed companies.