高层管理当局薪酬与上市公司业绩的相关性实证研究
Empirical Research on Correlation between Compensation Schemes of Management and the Change of Performance of Public Listed Companies
Abstract
本文在对国内外文献进行综评的基础上,立足于中国资本市场的特殊制度背景,分别选择会计绩效指标(ROA、ROE)、市场指标(Tobinq)以及股东财富指标(OF)构建模型,对我国上市公司高层管理当局的薪酬激励、特别是现金薪酬与上市公司业绩之间的相关性进行了经验研究,并减弱了相关的多重共线性现象。我们发现,高层管理当局薪酬与公司以及股东财富前后两期的变化,均成正相关关系;而与本期Tobinq的变化成负相关关系,与上期Tobinq的变化成正相关关系。公司的董事会或薪酬委员会在决定高层管理当局薪酬时青睐于会计盈余指标的变化更甚于信任股东财富指标。 Based on literature review on related research and particular institutions surrounding China,the paper selects both accounting performance index(ROE;ROA),market performance index(Tobin'q)and owner fortune(OF)to construct a model to analyze the relevance between cash compensation schemes and the change of performance of public listed companies,including dealing with multi-collinearly problem.The paper discovers that there is positive relation between compensation schemes of management and current period change and last period change of ROE,ROA and OF.There is negative relation between compensation schemes of management and current period change of Tobin'q and positive relation between compensation schemes of management and last period change of Tobin'q.Moreover,the paper also discovers that direction committee or bonus committee depends more on accounting earnings index than on owners wealth index to decide the compensation scheme.