An Empirical Study of Regulation Efficiency of New participant in Chinese Capital Market
- 管理学院－已发表论文 
本文构造多种监管有效性表征变量,重点考察独立董事和机构投资者这两种资本市场治理新参与者的实际监管效率。研究发现独立董事比例较高或机构投资者持股比例较高的样本,出现违规行为或信息披露不完全、不真实的概率较低,但在抑制关联交易或以“圈钱”为目的的配股增发行为中,两者的作用都没有得到实证支持。研究结果还显示,在监管有效性比较中,独立董事、机构投资者均起着积极的作用,独立董事的作用相对更为明显,而监事会的作用不显著。The paper firstly sets up various variables for regulation efficiency and mainly studies the regulation efficiency of independent director and institutional investor that are two new participants in the corporate governance of Chinese capital market. The research shows that samples with higher percentage of independent directors or institutional investors have lower possibility in incomplete or false information disclosure and violation behaviors, but there is no significant effect in controlling of correlated transaction or right offer. The study also indicates that both independent directors and institutional investors have positive effect in regulating and controlling, and furthermore, independent directors' role is relatively more significant than that of supervisors.