证券信息披露重大性标准解析——基于美国经验的探讨

Abstract

美国联邦证券法整个体系的基石是充分披露,然而充分披露并非意味着事无巨细地披露。证券立法者、司法者和SEC在披露规则中引入了重大性标准机制,而重大性标准在遏制和打击证券欺诈的同时,也会带来诸多弊端。因此,整个强制性信息披露制度陷入了两难的境地。为了有力地遏制证券发行人(上市公司)可能存在的欺诈行为,需要灵活的重大性标准,随时威慑缺乏诚信的证券发行人(上市公司);但灵活的重大性标准降低了法律明确预期的价值,同时又为司法、行政不当提供了机会。解决重大性标准的灵活性和确定性之间冲突的关键是如何约束各级法院、SEC、FASB和AICPA在解释重大标准时合理地行使自由裁量权。

The cornerstone of the whole American Federal Securities law is full disclosure. But full disclosure does not mean disclosure in all detail. So the legislator, judicial and SEC introduces the mechanism of materiality into the disclosure rules. However, in the meantime, the standard brings out the following shortcoming. So, the mandatory disclosure system faces a dilemma: in order to frustrate the securities fraud, it needs a flexible standard; but the flexible standard fails to furnish issuers with fair notice of liability. The key point of solving the conflict between flexibility and certainty is how to regulate the discretion of the courts, SEC, FASB and AICPA to interpret materiality.