Propping or Pulling out——Empirical Analysis from Related Acquisitions of Chinese listed Companies
- 管理学院－已发表论文 
本文以我国上市公司与其第一大股东或实际控制人的331起关联并购为研究样本,分析了上市公司大股东在关联并购中的可能动机,并检验了发生关联并购的上市公司的长期财务绩效与短期股票市场表现。实证研究表明,大股东在与其控制的业绩优良的上市公司的关联并购中具有较强的掏空动机;而对于业绩一般和较差的公司,大股东为了“保壳”或保“配”,会向上市公司注入优质资产或转让部分盈利性的股权,表现为一种“支持”。此外,关联并购并没有真正提高上市公司的财务绩效。This paper examines 331 mergers and acquisitions between Chinese listed companies and there majority shareholders or the real controllers of the company. This helps explore possible motivations for controlling shareholders in listed companies who engaged in such merger activities. We also analyze these listed companies' long-term and short-term financial performance after mergers and acquisitions. Empirical analysis shows significant motivation for majority shareholders to tunnel those listed companies with good financial performance. However, for companies in bad or ordinary financial situations, majority shareholders may inject valuable assets into the companies through such acquisitions in an attempt to remain control over the shell resources or SEO (seasonal equity offering), known as propping, contrary to tunneling. Last but not least, this study finds related party transactions do not help to improve listed companies' financial performance.