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dc.contributor.author周中胜
dc.contributor.author陈俊
dc.date.accessioned2017-11-14T01:05:25Z
dc.date.available2017-11-14T01:05:25Z
dc.date.issued2006-06-01
dc.identifier.citation财贸研究,2006,(03):134-141
dc.identifier.issn1001-6260
dc.identifier.otherCMYJ200603021
dc.identifier.urihttps://dspace.xmu.edu.cn/handle/2288/138112
dc.description.abstract本文以深沪两市2000-2002年所有A股公司作为样本,研究了大股东的资金侵占与上市公司盈余管理的关系。实证结果表明,大股东及其附属公司对上市公司的资金侵占越严重,上市公司进行盈余管理的程度越高,说明大股东的资金占用不仅可能影响上市公司的经营业绩,还会降低上市公司会计信息质量。
dc.description.abstractBased on the data of all Ashare listed companies over the period 20002002 in Shenzhen and Shanghai Securities Exchange, this paper investigates the relationship between controlling shareholder′s embezzlement of listed company′s funds and listed company′s earnings management. We find the significant positive relationship, namely the more listed company′s funds are embezzled by controlling shareholder, the more severely the listed company′s earnings are managed. This result suggests that controlling shareholder′s embezzlement of listed company′s funds not only may affect the listed company′s performance, but also may lower the quality of listed company′s accounting information.
dc.language.isozh_CN
dc.subject大股东控制
dc.subject资金占用
dc.subject盈余管理
dc.subject操控性应计数
dc.subjectlarge shareholder′s control
dc.subjectembezzlement of funds
dc.subjectearnings management
dc.subjectdiscretionary accruals
dc.title大股东资金占用与盈余管理
dc.title.alternativeControlling Shareholder′s Embezzlement of Listed Company′s Funds and Earning Management
dc.typeArticle


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