大股东资金占用与盈余管理

Abstract

本文以深沪两市2000-2002年所有A股公司作为样本,研究了大股东的资金侵占与上市公司盈余管理的关系。实证结果表明,大股东及其附属公司对上市公司的资金侵占越严重,上市公司进行盈余管理的程度越高,说明大股东的资金占用不仅可能影响上市公司的经营业绩,还会降低上市公司会计信息质量。

Based on the data of all Ashare listed companies over the period 20002002 in Shenzhen and Shanghai Securities Exchange, this paper investigates the relationship between controlling shareholder′s embezzlement of listed company′s funds and listed company′s earnings management. We find the significant positive relationship, namely the more listed company′s funds are embezzled by controlling shareholder, the more severely the listed company′s earnings are managed. This result suggests that controlling shareholder′s embezzlement of listed company′s funds not only may affect the listed company′s performance, but also may lower the quality of listed company′s accounting information.