代理成本理论综述及其对我国的借鉴意义

Abstract

在现代公司制度中,由于公司所有权和控制权的两权分离,股东和管理当局的利益函数和收益函数并不完全一致由此产生了代理问题。在经济学中,代理成本被定义为由于代理关系中两个利益主体目标上的差距而诱发的损失或代价。本文从契约理论和交易成本经济学开始对代理成本问题做一个理论综述,然后探讨其对我国的国有上市公司治理的借鉴意义。

In the modern corporate system, the ″agency cost″ exists because stoc kholders'utility function is not consistent with administrators because of the separation of ownership and control. ″Agency cost″ is defined as the induced loss or cost for the difference of object between two profit entities, and the ″a gency cost″ is existing between them. The article makes a theoretical summarizing through ″contractual theory″ and″transaction cost economics″ fields, and then discusses how we can use the essential of the ″agency cost″ in Chinese public companies.