Insider Trading and The Cost of Information Disclosure
- 管理学院－已发表论文 
当公司内部人获得私人信息时,他可以利用该信息进行交易获利.分析了这种动机存在时内部人交易引起的公司信息披露成本问题.采用贝叶斯理论,根据中国证券市场的状况,建立了一个描述内部人交易与公司信息披露关系的信息模型.分别在自愿信息披露和强制信息披露的情况下,研究了公司内部人的信息披露成本;特别地,在强制披露信息环境下就内部人交易不受限制和受到限制情形分析了信息披露成本的大小.结果表明:在自愿披露环境下,内部人不披露坏消息而披露好消息;在强制信息披露环境下,由于信息披露成本的原因,内部人愿意披露好消息而不愿意披露坏消息.When an insider obtains private information, he can utilize that information to make a trading profit. The information disclosure cost caused by insider trading was investigated. Based on the Bayesian theory, an information model to describe the relation between insider trading and information disclosure was proposed on the basis of the situation of Chinese securities market. The amount of insider information disclosure cost was studied on conditions of voluntary disclosure and mandatory disclosure. Specially, the disclosure cost in a mandatory disclosure system was probed into respectively under the conditions of permitting and forbidding insider trading. The results show that in a voluntary disclosure system, an insider discloses good news not bad news, while in a mandatory disclosure system, he would rather disclose good news than bad news because of the information disclosure cost.