Mechanism of Protection Director Interests in American Company Law and Its Reference to China
- 法学院－已发表论文 
随着公司所有权与经营权分离的普遍确立 ,资本市场的日趋发达 ,股东权保护与董事义务体系构造日益成为法律学者的研究重点 ,但作为权责平衡的另一面即董事利益保护问题却长期遭到冷落。本文试图从美国公司法董事利益保护机制入手 ,对其构造及特点展开剖析 ,并对其根源进行探究 ,以期为中国公司法董事利益保护机制的完善有所裨益。Perfection of protection of stockholder rights and strengthening of director obligations constitute the two fundamental features of company law in the 20th century. Whereas, in order to establish a reasonable risk share mechanism, prompt the formation of "professional fiduciary", promote the effectiveness of obligation system for directors, and adapt to company governance practices, it is unadmirable to neglect protecting directors' interests. As concerned with the America case, different legal tradition,economic ideal and certain contingence determine the protection model respectively. On the threshold of entering into WTO and with the development of socialist economy, the American practices concerned can benefit China, whose director's interests protection mechanism is devoid now.