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dc.contributor.advisor杜兴强
dc.contributor.author赖少娟
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-20T08:13:54Z
dc.date.available2017-06-20T08:13:54Z
dc.date.issued2016-01-04
dc.identifier.urihttps://dspace.xmu.edu.cn/handle/2288/129376
dc.description.abstractIPO盈余管理一直是我国资本市场中一个亟待解决的问题。作为缓解IPO过程中信息不对称的重要的外部治理机制,券商和审计师本应发挥遏止盈余管理行为的作用。然而,近来IPO市场上券商与审计师业务捆绑的现象愈演愈烈,券商通过选择特定的审计师搭档进行IPO业务合作,形成了鲜明的券商-审计师绑定关系。关于券商-审计师绑定关系对IPO盈余管理的影响,存在两种竞争性的假说:一是这一关系导致券商与审计师产生合谋,两者为了获得超额经济利益共同促进了公司的盈余管理行为;另一种则是这一关系为券商与审计师有效合作、建立良好信任关系的产物,两者通过多次合作产生信息优势从而降低公司的盈余管理程度。 本文通过理论分析发现,...
dc.description.abstractEarnings management around initial public offering (IPO) is a noteworthy matter in the Chinese stock market. Underwriter and external auditor, as important external mechanisms to alleviate the information asymmetry between issuers and investors, are supposed to curb corporate financial window dressing around IPO. However, underwriter-auditor relationship (UA relationship) is becoming more and more...
dc.language.isozh_CN
dc.relation.urihttp://210.34.4.28/opac/openlink.php?strText=48256&doctype=ALL&strSearchType=callno
dc.source.urihttp://210.34.4.13:8080/lunwen/detail.asp?serial=52685
dc.subject券商-审计师绑定关系
dc.subjectIPO盈余管理
dc.subject审计师行业专长
dc.subject合谋与合作
dc.subjectUnderwriter-Auditor Relationship
dc.subjectIPO Earnings Management
dc.subjectIndustry Specialist Auditor
dc.subjectConspiracy and Collaboration
dc.title券商-审计师绑定关系增加盈余管理吗?基于中国IPO市场的经验证据
dc.title.alternativeDoes Underwriter-Auditor Relationship Always Increase Earnings Management? Evidence from Chinese IPO Market
dc.typethesis
dc.date.replied2015-05-14
dc.description.note学位:管理学博士
dc.description.note院系专业:管理学院_会计学
dc.description.note学号:17520110153583


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