Reason,Rule and Action：On Joseph Raz's Theory of Reason
- 2017年 
【中文摘要】拉兹通过引入理由算子,对行动理由的概念和性质进行了深入分析,提出了理由是事实而非信念的观点,并将理由按层次和作用区分为第一顺序理由和第二顺序理由。在分析规则作为第二顺序理由的特殊性的基础上,拉兹更是将法律规则看作一种特殊的第二顺序的排斥性理由,解释了行动中的人们如何进行理由权衡和实践推理,并最终按规则来行动的实践过程。拉兹的理由理论不仅体现了他对传统实证主义分析法学的基本方法和理念的传承,为他在与自然法学的论战中,维护其强实证主义分析立场提供了有力的论战武器,更体现了他在实践哲学背景之下研究法律规则、规范与行为的关系以及实践推理问题的新思路。 【Abstract】By citing a reason-operator, Joseph Raz analyzed the concept and nature of reason. He held that reasons in action were facts rather than beliefs. He divided reasons into first-order and second-order reasons, arguing that rules were content independent reasons and the laws were second-order exclusionary reasons, and then he explained how the agents could weigh the reasons, perform practical reasoning and finally follow the rules. Raz's theory of reason not only reflected his inheritance of the basic methods and ideas of traditional positivist jurisprudence and provided a powerful weapon for his strong positivist jurisprudence in the debate with natural law jurisprudence, but also embodied his new approach to the research of laws, norms, behavior and practical reasoning from the perspective of practical philosophy.