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dc.contributor.author杜兴强
dc.contributor.author郭剑花
dc.contributor.author雷宇
dc.date.accessioned2016-05-17T02:15:19Z
dc.date.available2016-05-17T02:15:19Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.identifier.citation金融研究,2009,(11):162-177
dc.identifier.issn1002-7246
dc.identifier.otherJRYJ200911013
dc.identifier.urihttps://dspace.xmu.edu.cn/handle/2288/102472
dc.description.abstract本文选择中国资本市场民营上市公司2004年至2006年的经验数据,实证检验了不同类别的政治联系方式对公司业绩的影响。本文运用HAuSMAn方法检验不同政治联系方式和公司业绩之间是否具有内生性,并采用联立方程模型控制内生性。本文的实证研究结果表明:民营上市公司的政府官员类政治联系对公司业绩具有显著的、负向的影响,支持了“政府干预“观点(ArguMEnT);而代表委员类政治联系则具有显著的、正向的影响,支持了“关系“观点。
dc.description.abstractBased on the sample of private listed companies from 2004 to 2006 in Chinese capital market, this paper empirically examines the effect of different types of political connections on corporate performance.Politi- cal connections are classified as "government officials" connections and "members of People's Congress (PC) and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)" connections.The authors use Hausman ap- proach and simultaneous equations to test and control the endogenesis between different types of political con- nections and corporate performance respectively.The results show that "government officials" connections have significant negative effects on the performance of private listed companies, which supports the " government in- tervention" argument However, the "members of PC and CPPCC" connections have significant positive effects on the performance of private listed companies, which supports the "GuanXi" argument
dc.language.isozh_CN
dc.subject政治联系方式
dc.subject政府官员类政治联系
dc.subject代表委员类政治联系
dc.subject公司业绩
dc.subjecttypes of political connections
dc.subject"government officials" connections
dc.subject"members of PC and CPPCC"connections
dc.subjectcorporate performance
dc.title政治联系方式与民营上市公司业绩:“政府干预”抑或“关系”?
dc.title.alternativePolitical Connections and Corporate Performance of Private Listed Companies:Government Intervention or GuanXi?
dc.typeArticle


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