Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Test to Check-and-balance Ownership Structure,Tunneling and Corporate value
- 管理学院－已发表论文 
股权结构对大股东掏空行为及公司价值的影响是当前研究的热点问题之一。基于大股东掏空主要受到法律保护、其他大股东制衡和掏空成本3个因素影响的假设,作者借鉴llSV(2002)的研究,结合国情进行理论建模,证明了随着其他大股东的制衡能力的增强,第一大股东的掏空程度呈现先升后降的倒“u“型形态,被掏空的企业的价值呈现先降后升的“u“型形态;控制权与现金流权差异越大,终极控制人对公司的掏空就越大。本文收集1998~2003年我国A股市场168家上市公司的并购事件进行实证,其结果支持了本文模型的推论。其他大股东对第一大股东的制衡能力,当处于很强或很弱的两端时,比处于中间水平更有利于上市公司的价值。“多足鼎立“和“一股独大“的股权结构,未必比“分散持有“的股权结构低效。How the equity structure affects tunneling and corporate value is one of hot topics at present.Based on the assumption that tunneling is restricted by law,other large shareholders' counterbalance and costs,we set up a model refer to LLSV(2002)and the actual condition of China.The model shows: (1)the tunneling by the first large shareholder has reversed U shape relationship with other large shareholder's counterbalance.(2)The value of corporate whose resources are diverted has U shape relationship with other large shareholder's counterbalance.(3)The more the difference between voting right and cash flow right,the more the ultimate owners want to divert.We made empirical test using 168 acquisitions in Chinese stock market between 1998 and 2003.The results are consistent with the model.The first large shareholder holding majority shares or other large shareholders having strong counterbalance is more favorable to the corporate value.The equity structure of majority shareholders or multiple large shareholders, maybe is more effective than widely dispersed equity structure.