Introduction

There are several reasons why advertisements are particularly suitable for an analysis in terms of metaphor. The products advertised are never really presented in the advertisements, but represented in verbal or pictorial ways. Similarly, the act of buying, which is the ultimate goal of consumer advertising, is never executed in the advertisements, but is at best approached by covert requests like *Don't wait. Order now. Ring our hotline now*. More sophisticated advertisements take pains not to address the act of buying or ordering directly and do not verbalize how desirable the purchase of advertised items should be for the consumers. Yet there can be no doubt that this kind of indirect advertising works, and indeed it is often more effective than the cruder, more straight-forward variants. Metaphor is one of the means to express this indirect request.

I. Background of the research

Since the 1960's, a trend of interdisciplinary research in metaphor has been launched by western scholars. According to statistics, more than 4,000 related academic papers were published from 1972 to 1984. A symposium on *Metaphor and Thought* held in Illinois University in 1977 attracted a mass of well-known experts on philosophy, linguistics, psychology, and pedagogy, such as, J. R. Searle, T. S. Kuhn, G. Miller, R. W. Gibbs, and M. Blake, etc. Their meeting papers were edited and published by Ortony (Ortony, 1979/1993). Another interdisciplinary symposium on metaphor was held in Davis College of California University in 1978, and the papers were published too. Similar symposiums were held in succession in other countries, and the research papers and books emerged one after another. In the recent years, the research on metaphor has become popular in China. Theories and researches are introduced by some key publications. Even some scholars are engaged in the studies of metaphor.

Ortony (1979) suggests that the current theories on metaphor can be divided briefly into two groups: non-constructivism and constructivism. The former follows the theories of rhetoric and stylistics, which regard metaphor as a linguistic deviation (Ching, Haley and Lunsford, 1980). The latter treats metaphor as a dynamic process among language, reality and thought, and as a reflection of the nature of language and the mechanism of human intelligence (Ricoeur, 1977/1986; Ortony, 1979/1993). The researchers intend to discover the origin, development and use of language, and even

the mysteries of human cognition and intelligent development through the research in metaphor.

Under this background, M.A.K. Halliday pays his attention to metaphor, too. In the last chapter of his *An Introduction to Functional Grammar* (1985/1994), he states that metaphorical variation is lexicogrammatical rather than simply lexical, and even metaphors located in lexical expressions are often accompanied by grammatical variation (Halliday, 1985/1994: 341). He defines it as grammatical metaphor. This thesis intends to explain grammatical metaphor through the analysis of samples from print commercial advertising, and to reveal how the theory of grammatical metaphor contributes to the current research on metaphor.

II. Purpose and hypothesis of the research

The thesis is the study of metaphors in English print commercial advertising from the functional perspective. According to the previous studies, there are three categories of metaphors: phonological, grammatical and semantic metaphors (Halliday, 1978:176). This thesis concentrates on the analysis of grammatical metaphor and applies functional linguistics to the print commercial advertising texts. Within the framework of functional linguistics, Halliday (1985/1994:343) classifies grammatical metaphor into two main types: ideational metaphors (including metaphors of transitivity and nominalization), and interpersonal metaphors (including metaphors of mood and metaphors of modality). However, Halliday (ibid.) does not include textual metaphor in his survey of grammatical metaphor. So it is debatable whether the label "textual metaphor" is really justified. It is included in my study of print commercial advertising texts because of the assumption that rewording of theme and rheme is a kind of metaphorical forms. The thesis is designed to (i) examine the variations of these three main types of grammatical metaphor in advertising texts; (ii) count the frequencies of each sub-type of grammatical metaphor in different groups of advertising texts; (iii) explain the relation between grammatical metaphor and genre of advertising texts.

The research is based on the assumption that grammatical metaphor marks out the characteristics of advertising language and each advertising group has its typical type of grammatical metaphor.

III. Major contributions of the research

This thesis focuses on examining the grammatical metaphors in advertising texts from the functional perspective. Metaphors here are the rewording of the components of the clauses. This thesis analyzes advertising texts at grammatical level rather than simply their lexical meaning. With the support of statistics, grammatical metaphors are to be found relative to the genre of advertising groups. Though before this, many scholars concentrate their investigation of metaphors in advertising texts on the psychological and cognitive base. They lay emphasis on lexical meaning of metaphor. However, little is known about grammatical meaning of metaphor. The study of metaphors in advertising texts at grammatical level is still on early stage. The research in this thesis aims to contribute to this body of knowledge by examining advertising texts in terms of Functional Linguistics and intends to provide some suggestions to the current research on metaphor.

IV. Conceptual framework

In this section, two concepts are discussed, one is advertising, and the other is metaphor.

In its simplest sense the word "advertising" means "drawing attention to something" or notifying or informing somebody of something (Dyer, 1982:2). You can advertise by word of mouth, quite informally and locally, and without incurring great expense. But if you want to inform a large number of people of something, you might need to advertise in the more familiar sense of the word by public announcement. If you put up a notice in a local newsagent's shop, design a poster or buy some space in a local newspaper, you are likely to attract the attention of more people to the information you wish to communicate than if you simply pass the word around friends and neighbours.

There are many kinds of advertising, among which, commercial consumer advertising is perhaps the most visible kind in our society. It commands more expenditure, space and professional skills than any other types and is directed towards mass consumers. It therefore provides the focus of this thesis. However, the other types are worth mentioning.

Trade and technical advertisements are usually confined to specialized magazines like *Hi-Fi News*, *Amateur Gardener* or *Engineering Today*. They are aimed at the experts, professionals or hobbyists. Most trade advertising is informative and useful, so the consumers are usually well able to evaluate the claims of cost, value, use and so on.

Prestige, business and financial advertising is a growing sector of the advertising industry. Advertisements for the large companies or the publishing of yearly financial results in newspapers are usually designed to promote public confidence and favorable business images. Such advertising is not usually intended to influence sales directly. You will often see advertisements on television for such enterprises as the giant petrochemical firms or the large clearing banks which present themselves as disinterested pieces of these private corporations as benevolent, public-spirited and socially responsible. The inherent message in this type of campaign is the promotion of the capitalist enterprise and the values of the acquisitive society.

Small advertisements are usually straightforward and informative and have long since been relegated to the small print of the classified sections of newspapers or to such journals as *Exchange* and *Mart*.

Government and charity advertising is usually non-profit making, but often uses the persuasive techniques of commercial advertising. However, we should remember that an organization like the Health Education Council has a very small amount of money to promote anti-smoking in comparison with the giant tobacco firms who spend a great deal on encouraging people to smoke and thereby, by all accounts, to damage their health.

Advertising is one of the means used by manufacturing and service industries to ensure the distribution of commodities to people in society at large and is designed to create demands for such goods and services. It helps the manufacturer or business secure a section of the market by organizing and controlling people's tastes and behavior in the interests of company profit and capital growth. Advertising works not only on behalf of specific goods and services, but also assumes certain characteristics which are less directly connected to selling. It tries to manipulate people into buying a way of life as well as goods.

Metaphor is for most people a device of poetic imagination and rhetorical flourish,

and a matter of extraordinary rather than ordinary language. Moreover, metaphor is typically viewed as characteristic of language alone, a matter of words rather than thought or action. For this reason, most people think they can get along perfectly well without metaphor. We have found, on the contrary, that metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language, but also in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature.

The word metaphor comes from the Greek word *metaphora* which is derived from *meta* meaning "over" and *pherein*, "to carry". It refers to a particular set of linguistic processes whereby aspects of one objects are "carried over" or transferred to another object, so that the second object is spoken of as if it were the first. Metaphor is traditionally taken to be the most fundamental form of figurative language.

In the following sentence, for example, it is clear that "crippled" and "burden" are being used metaphorically (Thompson, 1996:163).

(1) The north is crippled with the burden of the industrial revolution to an extent that the south hardly begins to understand.

A typical analysis of the metaphors will point out that "crippled" has a literal meaning of "lame", while "burden" literally means "something heavy". In this view, metaphor is seen as relating to the way a particular word is used.

However, it is also possible to look at metaphor from the perspective of the meaning being expressed. The rationale for introducing this alternative perspective becomes clearer when we look at example (2):

(2) The north emerges from every statistical comparison that can be made as significantly poorer than the south.

The wording above is metaphorical because there a noun "comparison" encodes a happening, and a verb "emerge" encodes a complex meaning which involves among other things the logical relation of cause and effect ("as a result of comparing, people find out").

Thompson (1996:165) therefore gives a definition of grammatical metaphor as: the expression of a meaning through a lexico-grammatical form which originally evolved to express a different kind of meaning. The concept covers lexical metaphor as well: there is no difference between the two kinds, and lexical metaphor can be seen as a sub-category of grammatical metaphor. Halliday (1985/1994:342) comments: "for any given semantic configuration there will be some realization in the lexicogrammar – some wording – that can be considered congruent; there may also be various others that are in some respect 'transferred', or metaphorical".

V. Organization of the remainder of the thesis

This section gives a brief idea about what direction this thesis is moving on. The remainder of the thesis continues to deal with grammatical metaphor and its application to print commercial advertising text. Chapter One is a survey of the related literature, in which the related approaches to metaphor, the notions of grammatical metaphor, and the research on metaphor in advertising texts are mentioned and examined. Moreover, the research design, data collection and its procedures, and hypothesis of the research are also involved. The thesis discusses three types of grammatical metaphor: ideational metaphors, interpersonal metaphors, and textual metaphor. Chapter Two analyzes the ideational metaphors, which include metaphors of transitivity and nominalization. Halliday (1985/1994) defines that there are six types of process in the transitivity system. Each of them has its metaphorical forms in print advertising texts and their realizations are explored in this chapter. Nominalization is also a representation of ideational metaphors. The lexical density, which is the frequency that nominal groups appear in clause, is discussed here. Chapter Three examines interpersonal metaphors, which include metaphors of modality and metaphors of mood, and textual metaphor, with an attempt to explore their variations in the print commercial advertising texts. Chapter Four gives a quantitative analysis of grammatical metaphors in advertising groups, with an attempt to test if the hypothesis is reasonable. It also takes an insight into the reasons why grammatical metaphor appears in the print advertising texts, and explains the result of the research.

Chapter One   Literature Review

Scholars and practitioners in many fields are interested in metaphor. Rhetoricians have long been dealing with it and asserting the persuasive power of metaphor. Literary scholars, as well, have relied on an analysis of metaphor and symbol to attain a deeper understanding of the meaning and significance of a text.

1.1   Theoretical basis of current research on metaphor

Language which means (or intends to mean) what it says, and which uses words in their standard sense, derived from the common practice of ordinary speakers of the language, is said to be literal. Figurative language deliberately interferes with the system of literal usage by its assumption that terms literally connected with one object can be transferred to anther object. The interference takes the form of transference, or "carrying over" with the aim of achieving a new, wider, special or more precise meaning. Linguists in different times take various perspectives on metaphor. The following is the related literature on the research of metaphor.

1.1.1   Cognitive approaches to metaphor

The contribution to metaphor theory by Lakoff & Johnson (1980, 1987, 1993) needs to be assessed by confronting their views with some earlier approaches that also contribute to cognitive theory.

We start then with an overview of predecessors whose tenets are accompanied by a claim of cognitive domains or models. My inquiry into this matter covers the following philosophers and linguists: John Locke (1689), Giambattista Vico (1744), Johann Gottfried Herder (1770), Franz Wullner (1827), Johann Adam Hartung (1831), Hermann Paul (1880), F. Max Muller (1888), Ernst Cassirer (1923), Jose Ortegay Gasset (1925), Karl Buhler (1934), Jost Trier (1934), Benjamin Lee Whorf (1939), Arnold Gehlen (1940), Walter Porzig (1950), Franz Dornseiff (1955), Nelson Goodman (1968), Hannah Arendt (1971), J.M.Anderson (1971), G.A.Miller & P.N.Johnson-Laird (1976), Julian Jaynes (1976). Every single approach would be worth a detailed exploration and could be seen in comparison with the tenets of the cognitive theory of metaphor.

For about three hundred years, various European philosophers and linguists have been anticipating the central tenets and findings of the cognitive theory of metaphor. The following scholars and their tenets are the typical representation of cognitive theory and its development.

1.1.1.1 Kant's concept of analogy and his "symbolical sensualisation"

The first predecessor of the cognitive theory of metaphor to be treated more comprehensively is Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), who ascertains two sources of knowledge: conceptual understanding and sensual intuition. Only the combination of these two constituents yields real knowledge. The crucial point for us is that intuition is a necessary constituent of knowledge (Kant, 1781/87:33). Kant does not have a special term metaphor, but speaks symbols instead (Blumenberg, 1960:10; Keil, 1991:226). Thus what he explains "symbolical sensualisation" is justified in translating "metaphorical sensualisation".

Kant also speaks of analogy, which is construed as "the transfer of reflection on some object of intuition to a completely different concept, maybe one to which no intuition can ever correspond directly". This is the equivalent of Lakoff' and Johnson's cognitive-conceptual definition of metaphor, which is combined with a claim of necessity and a epistemological reason for the uni-directionality of metaphor: concepts to which no intuition corresponds directly are experientially grounded by means of analogical transfer.

Kant ascertains the ubiquity of metaphor in everyday language. What seems most commendable in the way of the theory of metaphor is Kant's statement that there is no similarity "between a despotic state and a democratic aspect", i.e. "objectively" between target domain and source domain, "but between the rule for reflecting on either of the two and their causality": reflection by means of conceptual metaphor only constitutes similarities in the sense of analogical relations between the elements and their functional connections in both target domain and source domain. This analogy, which appears quite modern in our age of cognitive science, is exemplified further in various other parts of Kant's works. Thus we conceptualize the BEAVER'S LODGE metaphorically as HUMAN ARCHITECTURE (Kant, 1790:90), TIME as a POINTED LINE (Kant, 1781/87:50), or GOD'S CREATION as a WORK OF ART (Kant, 1781/87:655, 1783:57, 1790:90). The last example in particular stands for the finding that the whole realm of the metaphysical depends completely on metaphorical

conceptualization. Kant (1790:59) states: "thus all our knowledge of god is only symbolical".

To sum up, despite its conciseness, Kant's exposition of "symbolical sensualisation" by means of analogy anticipates the most important tenets of the cognitive theory of metaphor. In addition, this approach is given an explicit epistemological grounding. This deeper investigation which the cognitive and linguistic phenomenon of metaphor merits according to Kant may be claimed by Lakoff and Johnson as their genuine achievement.

1.1.1.2 Blumenberg's philosophical "metaphorology"

The German philosopher Hans Blumenberg (1920-1996) develops his theory of metaphor and the method of metaphorology in two extensive essays, "Paradigmen au einer Metaphorologie" (1960), and "Beobachtungen an Metaphern" (1971). Some of his later books (1979a, 1989) can be seen as applications of this metaphorology.

Blumenberg (1960:9) notes that metaphors can be "basic components of philosophical language, transfers which cannot be brought back to the real, into logicality". He (1960:11) also provides the following explanation, "That these metaphors are called absolute means only that they resist the terminological claim of being dissolvable into literalness. It does not mean that one metaphor could not be replaced or substituted or even corrected by another more precise one". It is true that Blumenberg's fundamental observations are concerned with the language of philosophy fixed in writing. We will soon see that his approach cannot be confined to that special language, but applies to language in general.

Exactly like in the cognitive theory of metaphor, linguistic metaphors are regarded as expressions and symptoms of cognitive models, systematic structures of thought that provide general orientation though they usually reside in the speakers' subconsciousness. Thus, even for many utterances that at first glance may appear unmetaphorical, the following applies (Blumenberg, 1960:16):

… on closer inspection they are clearly oriented around a metaphorical background, which we propose to call "implicative model". This means that metaphors in their function discussed here do not have to emerge at all in the sphere of linguistic expressions. But a context of utterances may suddenly merge in a unity of sense if we can hypothetically reconstruct the metaphorical model

from which these utterances are read.

In addition to such metaphorical models, Blumenberg (1960:69) speaks of "background metaphors", explaining this notion as "the implicit use of a metaphor"(1960:86). These background metaphors are mostly equivalent to our conceptual metaphors. As these are also found in ordinary everyday language, the project of a systematic metaphorology gains importance outside the domain of philosophy as well.

Such a metaphorology can take linguistic metaphor as "a guiding line for observing our everyday world" (1979b: 83). It enables the socio-historical study of those background metaphors known as cultural models in the cognitive theory of metaphor.

The fact that Blumenberg exemplifies these metaphors primarily with linguistic material taken from the classics of philosophy, science, and literature should not prevent his recognition as accomplished predecessor of the cognitive theory of metaphors. We recognize his exposition of the relationship between linguistic metaphors and cultural models as well as the analysis of their cognitive function. Moreover, even the focusing character of metaphor is known to Blumenberg, who speaks of the "phenomenon of metaphorical definition of perspective" (Blumenberg, 1960:75).

1.1.1.3 Weinrich's linguistic theory of metaphorical "image fields"

The German linguist Harald Weinrich unfolds his theory of metaphor in five essays published between 1958 and 1976. Of all predecessors presented here, Weinrich's approach is the one that comes closest to the cognitive theory of metaphor, anticipating all its central tenets. Right from the beginning of his theoretical discussion Weinrich displays his conceptual understanding of metaphor, analyzing linguistic metaphors not in isolation but situated within domains. As will be seen in the following, the term image field is Weinrich's equivalent to the current conceptual metaphor. Weinrich even formulates an explicit domain hypothesis (1958:283): "What really takes place in the actual and apparently singular metaphor is the linkage of two conceptual domains". Later he provides the following explanation (1967:326): "…above the actual metaphor as a speech act, in our linguistic competence there is an image field as a virtual structure". Such metaphorical domains are then identified as semantic fields. Weinrich's terminological equivalents are to the source domain and

target domain of the cognitive approach.

The two tenets of metaphorical models and of the necessity of metaphor are also central to Weinrich's approach. First he (Weinrich, 1963:316) formulates a hypothesis of the linguistic necessity, using the target domain of TIME as an example: "We cannot refer to time without speaking metaphorically". That the ultimate reason for this linguistic finding lies in the cognitive necessity of metaphor is stated as a part of Weinrich's discussion of the target domain MEMORY: "We cannot think of an object such as memory without recourse to metaphors. Metaphors, especially if they appear in consistent image fields, must be estimated as (hypothetical) cognitive models" (Weinrich, 1964:294).

Weinrich makes an effort to supplement his conceptual-metaphorical image fields with a definition of metaphor on the language level. In this he follows a semantic approach, very rightly regarding linguistic metaphor as a contextual phenomenon:

A metaphor is never a simple word, but always a piece of text, however small. And do no let orthography, that eternal temptress of linguistic analysis, deceive you: Windrose, though one word in written German, is a piece of text in which the element Wind provides the context for the element Rose, determining it to become metaphorical (Weinrich, 1967:319).

Thus by its use in a particular context, the original meaning of a lexeme is converted to a metaphorical reading. Weinrich (1967:320) calls this process "counter determination", thus gaining his definition of linguistic metaphor: "With this concept, metaphor can be defined as a word in a counter-determinating context".

The accounts of Kant, Blumenberg, and Weinrich's contributions to the theory of metaphor are meant to give an idea of the extensive similarities and concurrences. These scholars of completely different backgrounds have reached the same or very similar results independently of each other. Thus the epistemologist Kant hits on metaphor in the course of his critical stocktaking of human understanding. Blumenberg, the historian of philosophy, discovers metaphor while reconstructing the history of central philosophical and scientific concepts. The linguist Weinrich resembles the cognitive researchers of metaphor most closely also as regards his own heuristics, with his theory of metaphor resulting from the philological-linguistic observation of everyday language.

Thus it has been shown that the works of Kant, Blumenberg, and Weinrich have more to offer to the cognitive approach than mere anticipations. Their genuine contributions to methodology should not be ignored by a cognitive theory of metaphor.

1.1.1.4   Lakoff and Johnson's approach

Lakoff and Johnson (1980:3) follow the same line in their claim that the human thinking process is "fundamentally metaphorical in nature". They argue against the assumption that metaphors are a deviation from some arbitrarily defined "normal" speech. Metaphor for them is not only "a matter of … ordinary language", but also "a matter of … thought and action".

They distinguish between three kinds of metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980:14,25). "Structural metaphors" occur when one concept is "metaphorically structured" on the basis of another. When a metaphorical concept "organizes", rather than "structures" a whole system of concepts, they refer to it as an "orientational metaphor". "Ontological metaphors" occur when human experience of physical objects and substances provides a basis for understanding abstract things, such as activities, emotions and ideas, of which we tend not to have direct knowledge. This allows us to relate more directly to them.

The underlying assumption behind Lakoff and Johnson's thinking is that the language we use in everyday life, including metaphor, is the evidence of how we understand and experience things. They (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980:4) claim that our ordinary conceptual system is fundamentally metaphorical, and that it is metaphors which structure our way of perceiving, thinking and acting. This type of framework or "conceptual system" depends on the way we interact with our physical and cultural environments. Some of these conceptual systems will be universal, while others will be dependent on language and culture.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980:4) give examples of what they claim to be a pervasive English ontological metaphor: ARGUMENT IS WAR:

(3) Your claims are *indefensible*.
(4) He *attacked every weak point* in my argument.
(5) His criticisms were *right on target*.

(6) I *demolished* his argument.

(7) I've never *won* an argument with him.

This conceptual system is not exclusive to the English language, for it is universal in general language. It seems reasonable to suggest that the language we use affects our perception and thinking processes, but Lakoff and Johnson (1980:5) claim more than this:

The metaphor (of war) is not merely in the words we use – it is in our very concept of an argument. The language of argument is not poetic, fanciful, or rhetorical; it is literal.

Unfortunately, they do not define what they mean by "literal". It is clear that Lakoff and Johnson are referring to metaphor not just as a linguistic device, but also as a cognitive object. To say that there is some interaction between the metaphors we use in the particular natural language and the concepts we employ in perceiving and thinking is one thing; to say that they are identical is another, which is far harder to accept. The claim that the linguistic representation in a specific language is identical to the cognitive representation employed by the people of that linguistic community requires further evidence.

1.1.2 Pragmatic approach to metaphor

There has been a considerable amount of work over the last two decades which claim that metaphors are best analyzed in the domain of pragmatics (Grice, 1975; Sperber and Wilson, 1986a; Wilson and Sperber, 1988b; Levinson, 1983; Blakemore, 1987 and 1992; Wilson, 1990). John Wilson (1990:112) presents a consensus view among Gricean pragmatists that beneath the surface form of metaphors there is meaning, which is accessed through some model of conversational interaction. These pragmatists share the assumption that there is either one or more underlying principles which govern communication, and hence the understanding of metaphors.

1.1.2.1 Grice's approach to metaphor

Grice (1975) sees metaphor as violating his maxim of truthfulness: "Do not say what you believe to be false." A speaker who says that *p* indicates that he believes that *p*, that is to say, that the proposition expressed by the speaker's utterance must be identical to a belief of the speaker. In such a framework, a metaphor has to be treated as a deviation from the norm, because the proposition expressed by the utterance containing a metaphor is not identical to the belief of the speaker. Hence, metaphors involve a deliberate violation of the maxim of truthfulness, and the comprehension of metaphorical utterances depends on the hearer finding the utterances to be false.

Grice (1975:52) gives as an example (8), which can be interpreted as a metaphor as in example (9):

(8) You are the cream in my coffee.
(9) You are my pride and joy.

Let us see how Grice's schema looks in this example of metaphor. The schema is treated in an expanded form, in order to make it more workable:

(10) a. He has said that I am the cream in his coffee.

   a'. This is obviously false.

   b. There is no reason to suppose that he is not observing the truthfulness maxim at some level, though he is blatantly not doing so at the level of what he said.

   c. He could not be doing this unless he thought that I have some of the features associated with cream in coffee.

   c'. A likely feature is that of giving pleasure, adding something extra.

   d. He knows (and knows that I know that he knows) that I can see that the supposition that he thinks that I am his pride and joy is required.

   e. He has done nothing to stop me thinking that I am his pride and joy.

   f. He intends me to think, or at least is willing to allow me to think, that I am his pride and joy.

   g. And so, he has implicated that I am his pride and joy.

As discussed above, the content of the implicature which is introduced in (10c) is not deducible from either (10a) or (10b). Nowhere in this calculation is it explained how the hearer is expected to derive this particular implicature.

Grice's calculation becomes yet more problematic when returns to example (11) (Grice, 1975:53), saying that it is possible "to combine metaphor and irony" in a single utterance "by imposing on the hearer two stages of interpretation". According to this idea, the speaker, by uttering (8), intends the hearer to derive (9), and then go on to recover:

(11) You are my bane.

But Grice does not explain where the expression (11) comes from or how the hearer might derive (9) alone in some circumstances, rather than both (9) and (11).

Moreover, (9) is inherently a poor paraphrase of what the speaker intended to convey with (8). For example, the speaker may have intended to communicate something about the voluptuousness of the hearer with the metaphor of cream, which he cannot communicate with (9). Grice thus fails to account for the richness of metaphor.

1.1.2.2   A relevance-based approach to metaphor

Wilson and Sperber (1988b: 139) deny the requirement for any maxim of truthfulness, and argue that there is no discontinuity between metaphorical and non-metaphorical utterances. They (ibid.) hold that "every utterance comes with a guarantee of faithfulness, not of truth". In their view, every utterance is a faithful representation of a thought, but it is not necessarily identical with that thought. Thus a metaphorical utterance faithfully resembles a thought which the speaker intends to communicate.

Sperber and Wilson (1986a: 264) explain the indeterminacy and the richness of metaphor by treating it as a variety of "loose talk" and treat metaphorical utterances as reflecting a difference degree in the scale of "resemblance" between the utterances used and the thought communicated. This applies to all cases of utterance interpretation, thus allowing them to account for metaphors and other less than literal utterances without abandoning truth-conditional semantics.

The notion of interpretive resemblance is crucial to their account. There is interpretive

resemblance between a given utterance and the thought expressed by that utterance, if they resemble each other in sharing part of each other's content. Literalness is merely an extreme case in the scale of resemblance. Metaphors are the result of choosing an utterance which is a less than literal interpretation of the speaker's thought. The proposition expressed by the utterance shares some of the analytic and contextual implications of the thought which it resembles.

There is no clear definition as to which contextual effects are shared between metaphors and the thoughts which they resemble, because metaphors often convey an indeterminate range of thoughts. Accordingly, the speaker intends to communicate a range of implicatures, rather than a fixed set. Communication succeeds when the hearer has recovered some of the implicatures within the range. The relevance of a metaphor to the hearer is established by recovering an array of implicatures.

Bencherif (1987) points out that the hearer, in her search for optimal relevance, is forced to see a resemblance between the object featured in the metaphor and the object to which the metaphorical utterance refers. This may explain one of the advantages offered by metaphor. Namely, metaphor enables the hearer to find out some resemblance between things where she may not have seen it before.

The range and strength of recovered implicatures give rise to two broad types of metaphor. In the case of standardized metaphors, the addressed is encouraged to recover a narrow range of strong implicatures. In the case of creative metaphors, the addressee is forced to look for a wide range of weak implicatures.

The notion of weak communication is important for the indeterminate nature of metaphors and the way in which they are processed by the hearer. The hearer's comprehension of an utterance, that is, the assumptions from which she infers, may not be limited to those which the speaker specifically intended her to recover. She may recover some implications which she infers on her own responsibility.

There is no process of considering the literal interpretation, then rejecting it and looking for a non-literal interpretation. The hearer accepts the first interpretation to yield adequate contextual effects for the minimal rationally expected effort. The first accessible interpretation in the case of metaphor should be less than literal one, given the context in which the utterance is processed. Thus if somebody in the middle of an

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